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Collaboration for a two-echelon supply chain in the pulp and paper industry: the use of incentives to increase profit

Author

Listed:
  • N Lehoux

    (FORAC, Université Laval)

  • S D'Amours

    (FORAC, Université Laval)

  • Y Frein

    (Laboratoire G-SCOP INPG-CNRS-UJF)

  • A Langevin

    (CIRRELT, École Polytechnique de Montréal)

  • B Penz

    (Laboratoire G-SCOP INPG-CNRS-UJF)

Abstract

In our research, we study the case of a pulp and paper producer who decides to establish a partnership with one buyer. Using two different types of relationship, namely a traditional system without any collaboration scheme and Collaborative Planning, Forecasting and Replenishment, we develop decision models describing the producer and the buyer planning processes. We also identify which approach is more profitable for each actor as well as for the network, based on real costs and parameters obtained from the industrial case. We then test how different incentives can improve the traditional system and provide higher gains for each partner. Our results show that using incentives increases the system's profit by up to 4% if parameters are well defined.

Suggested Citation

  • N Lehoux & S D'Amours & Y Frein & A Langevin & B Penz, 2011. "Collaboration for a two-echelon supply chain in the pulp and paper industry: the use of incentives to increase profit," Journal of the Operational Research Society, Palgrave Macmillan;The OR Society, vol. 62(4), pages 581-592, April.
  • Handle: RePEc:pal:jorsoc:v:62:y:2011:i:4:d:10.1057_jors.2009.167
    DOI: 10.1057/jors.2009.167
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

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    3. Saikouk, Tarik & Badraoui, Ismail & Spalanzani, Alain, 2014. "The Forest Supply Chain Management: An Entropic Perspective," Chapters from the Proceedings of the Hamburg International Conference of Logistics (HICL), in: Kersten, Wolfgang & Blecker, Thorsten & Ringle, Christian M. (ed.), Next Generation Supply Chains: Trends and Opportunities. Proceedings of the Hamburg International Conference of Logistics (HICL), Vol. 18, volume 18, pages 487-513, Hamburg University of Technology (TUHH), Institute of Business Logistics and General Management.
    4. Kefeng Xu & Yang Dong & Yu Xia, 2014. "‘Too Little’ or ‘Too Late’: The Timing of Supply Chain Demand Collaboration," Working Papers 0203mss, College of Business, University of Texas at San Antonio.
    5. Arroyo, Federico, 2024. "Cost Allocation in Vehicle Routing Problems with Time Windows," Junior Management Science (JUMS), Junior Management Science e. V., vol. 9(1), pages 1241-1268.

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