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Game-Theoretic Analyses of Bargaining

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  • Robert L. Bishop

Abstract

I. Characteristics of the game-theoretic approach, 559. — II. Theories of fixed-threat bargaining: Nach's theory, 563; the Zeuthen-Harsanyi theory, 566; Raiffa's theories, 569; a welfare theory, 572; further critique, 574. — III. Theories of variable-threat bargaining: an illustrative duopoly situation, 582; Nash's theory, 589; a Shapley theory, 593; Raiffa's theories, 594; Braithwaite's theory, 595; other theories, 597; Critical evaluation, 599. — IV. Conclusion, 602.

Suggested Citation

  • Robert L. Bishop, 1963. "Game-Theoretic Analyses of Bargaining," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 77(4), pages 559-602.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:qjecon:v:77:y:1963:i:4:p:559-602.
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    1. repec:eee:labchp:v:2:y:1986:i:c:p:1091-1137 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Martin Patchen, 1970. "Discussions and Reviews : Models of cooperation and conflict: a critical review," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 14(3), pages 389-407, September.
    3. repec:eee:labchp:v:2:y:1986:i:c:p:1039-1089 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. William M. Evan & John A. MacDougall, 1967. "Interorganizational conflict: a labor-management bargaining experiment," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 11(4), pages 398-413, December.
    5. Isard Walter & Anderton Charles H., 1999. "Survey of the Peace Economics Literature: Recent Key Contributions and a Comprehensive Coverage Up to 1992 (Part II)," Peace Economics, Peace Science, and Public Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 5(4), pages 1-55, October.
    6. Alessandro Innocenti, 2008. "Linking Strategic Interaction and Bargaining Theory: The Harsanyi-Schelling Debate on the Axiom of Symmetry," History of Political Economy, Duke University Press, vol. 40(1), pages 111-132, Spring.
    7. Stephen Weiss-Wik, 1983. "Enhancing Negotiators' Successfulness," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 27(4), pages 706-739, December.
    8. Papatya Duman & Walter Trockel, 2016. "On non-cooperative foundation and implementation of the Nash solution in subgame perfect equilibrium via Rubinstein's game," The Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design, Society for the Promotion of Mechanism and Institution Design, University of York, vol. 1(1), pages 83-107, December.

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