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Dynamic De/Centralization in Germany, 1949–2010

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  • André Kaiser
  • Stephan Vogel

Abstract

As part of the project Why Centralization and Decentralization in Federations?, this article measures dynamic de/centralization in Germany since 1949 and seeks to explain the patterns observed. It shows stability in numerous policy fields as well as an overall marked centralization over time, especially in the fiscal and administrative spheres. The principal instrument of dynamic de/centralization has been the enactment of legislation in fields of shared responsibility, with constitutional change also being important. In the 1950s and 1960s, an incremental centralization occurred as political and administrative elites strongly favored uniform living conditions. In a context of Keynesian interventionism and a broad consensus about social planning, the Great Fiscal Reform of 1969 amplified this centralizing trend. The East-West unification of 1989-1990 increased the economic and fiscal heterogeneity of the Länder and challenged the cultural norm of uniformity. The resulting federalism reforms of 2006 and 2009 blended decentralizing and centralizing measures.

Suggested Citation

  • André Kaiser & Stephan Vogel, 2019. "Dynamic De/Centralization in Germany, 1949–2010," Publius: The Journal of Federalism, CSF Associates Inc., vol. 49(1), pages 84-111.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:publus:v:49:y:2019:i:1:p:84-111.
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/publius/pjx054
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Thomas Döring & Jan Schnellenbach, 2011. "A tale of two federalisms: Germany, the United States and the ubiquity of centralization," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 22(1), pages 83-102, March.
    2. Scharpf, Fritz W., 2009. "Föderalismusreform: Kein Ausweg aus der Politikverflechtungsfalle?," Schriften aus dem Max-Planck-Institut für Gesellschaftsforschung Köln, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies, volume 64, number 64.
    3. Arthur Benz, 0. "From Unitary to Asymmetric Federalism in Germany: Taking Stock after 50 Years," Publius: The Journal of Federalism, CSF Associates Inc., vol. 29(4), pages 55-78.
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    Cited by:

    1. Oliver Schmidtke, 2021. "Policy Formation and Citizenship Practices: Germany’s Regions as Laboratories for Immigrant Integration," Journal of International Migration and Integration, Springer, vol. 22(4), pages 1349-1368, December.
    2. Tobias Arnold & Sean Mueller & Adrian Vatter, 2021. "Shock or Design: What Drives Fiscal De/Centralization? A Comparative Analysis of Twenty-Nine OECD Countries, 1995–2017," Publius: The Journal of Federalism, CSF Associates Inc., vol. 51(1), pages 1-26.

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