IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/oup/oxecpp/v57y2005i3p497-521.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Natural-resource exploitation with costly enforcement of property rights

Author

Listed:
  • Louis Hotte

Abstract

A model of resource exploitation when private ownership requires costly enforcement is developed. Enforcement costs are endogenized as the outcome of a game between a resource owner and illegal extractors. I find that two instruments are used to deter illegal extraction: policing efforts and purposeful 'overexploitation' of the resource. The latter works by reducing the returns from illegal activities. Hence, even with private ownership, the marginal product of a resource worker may be below his marginal product in alternative employment. Conditions are found for which at low wage rates, further wage reductions lower profits. Those conditions are necessary and sufficient for the existence of a range of low wages characterized by a free-access equilibrium. This may explain the more frequent prevalence of free access in less-developed countries. I show that higher resource prices will not lead to more free-access, but may lead to 'value destruction'. Copyright 2005, Oxford University Press.

Suggested Citation

  • Louis Hotte, 2005. "Natural-resource exploitation with costly enforcement of property rights," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 57(3), pages 497-521, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:oxecpp:v:57:y:2005:i:3:p:497-521
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/oep/gpi020
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or search for a different version of it.

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Chichilnisky, Graciela, 1994. "North-South Trade and the Global Environment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(4), pages 851-874, September.
    2. Clarke, Harry R. & Reed, William J. & Shrestha, Ram M., 1993. "Optimal enforcement of property rights on developing country forests subject to illegal logging," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(3), pages 271-293, September.
    3. Gary S. Becker, 1974. "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach," NBER Chapters, in: Essays in the Economics of Crime and Punishment, pages 1-54, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Frank A. Cowell, 1990. "Cheating the Government: The Economics of Evasion," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262532484, April.
    5. repec:bla:econom:v:48:y:1981:i:192:p:365-79 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Robin Brooks & Michael Murray & Stephen Salant & Jill C. Weise, 1999. "When Is the Standard Analysis of Common Property Extraction under Free Access Correct? A Game-Theoretic Justification for Non-Game-Theoretic Analyses," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 107(4), pages 843-858, August.
    7. Tornell, Aaron & Velasco, Andes, 1992. "The Tragedy of the Commons and Economic Growth: Why Does Capital Flow from Poor to Rich Countries?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(6), pages 1208-1231, December.
    8. George J. Stigler, 1974. "The Optimum Enforcement of Laws," NBER Chapters, in: Essays in the Economics of Crime and Punishment, pages 55-67, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    9. Baumol,William J. & Oates,Wallace E., 1988. "The Theory of Environmental Policy," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521322249, September.
    10. repec:bla:kyklos:v:42:y:1989:i:3:p:319-45 is not listed on IDEAS
    11. Cohen, Jon S. & Weitzman, Martin L., 1975. "A Marxian model of enclosures," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(4), pages 287-336, November.
    12. International Monetary Fund, 1997. "Corruption and the Rate of Temptation: Do Low Wages in the Civil Service Cause Corruption?," IMF Working Papers 1997/073, International Monetary Fund.
    13. James A. Brander & M. Scott Taylor, 1997. "International Trade and Open-Access Renewable Resources: The Small Open Economy Case," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 30(3), pages 526-552, August.
    14. Cheung, Steven N S, 1970. "The Structure of a Contract and the Theory of a Non-exclusive Resource," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 13(1), pages 49-70, April.
    15. Jon G. Sutinen & Peder Andersen, 1985. "The Economics of Fisheries Law Enforcement," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 64(4), pages 387-397.
    16. Barry C. Field, 1989. "The Evolution of Property Rights," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 42(3), pages 319-345, August.
    17. Lasserre, Pierre, 1994. "Protection décentralisée des droits de propriété, police et justice," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 70(2), pages 177-189, juin.
    18. Anderson, Terry L & Hill, Peter J, 1975. "The Evolution of Property Rights: A Study of the American West," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 18(1), pages 163-179, April.
    19. Ehrlich, Isaac, 1973. "Participation in Illegitimate Activities: A Theoretical and Empirical Investigation," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 81(3), pages 521-565, May-June.
    20. Helsley, Robert W. & Strange, William C., 1994. "Exclusion and the private enforcement of property rights," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(2), pages 291-308, February.
    21. Besley, Timothy, 1995. "Property Rights and Investment Incentives: Theory and Evidence from Ghana," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(5), pages 903-937, October.
    22. Friedman, David & Sjostrom, William, 1993. "Hanged for a Sheep--The Economics of Marginal Deterrence," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 22(2), pages 345-366, June.
    23. Milliman, Scott R., 1986. "Optimal fishery management in the presence of illegal activity," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 13(4), pages 363-381, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Max Iván Aladave Ruiz & Cecilia Garcìa-Peñalosa, 2008. "Education, Corruption and the Natural Resource Curse," Working Papers halshs-00340997, HAL.
    2. Hotte, Louis & Long, Ngo Van & Tian, Huilan, 2000. "International trade with endogenous enforcement of property rights," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 62(1), pages 25-54, June.
    3. van der Ploeg, Frederick & Rohner, Dominic, 2012. "War and natural resource exploitation," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 56(8), pages 1714-1729.
    4. Henri Atangana ondoa, 2014. "The determinants of corporate corruption in Cameroon," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 34(2), pages 938-950.
    5. Hotte, Louis & McFerrin, Randy & Wills, Douglas, 2013. "On the dual nature of weak property rights," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(4), pages 659-678.
    6. Ollivier, Hélène, 2012. "Growth, deforestation and the efficiency of the REDD mechanism," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 64(3), pages 312-327.
    7. Hotte, Louis, 2001. "Conflicts over property rights and natural-resource exploitation at the frontier," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 1-21, October.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Robinson, Elizabeth J.Z. & Kumar, Ajay Mahaputra & Albers, Heidi J., 2009. "Optimal Enforcement and Practical Issues of Resource Protection in Developing Countries," RFF Working Paper Series dp-09-08-efd, Resources for the Future.
    2. Elizabeth J. Z. Robinson, 2004. "Wanted dead and alive: Are hunting and protection of endangered species compatible?," CSAE Working Paper Series 2004-20, Centre for the Study of African Economies, University of Oxford.
    3. Ronan Congar & Louis Hotte, 2021. "Open Access Versus Restricted Access in a General Equilibrium with Mobile Capital," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 78(3), pages 521-544, March.
    4. Hotte, Louis & McFerrin, Randy & Wills, Douglas, 2013. "On the dual nature of weak property rights," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(4), pages 659-678.
    5. Nøstbakken, Linda, 2008. "Fisheries law enforcement--A survey of the economic literature," Marine Policy, Elsevier, vol. 32(3), pages 293-300, May.
    6. Eggert, Håkan & Lokina, Razack B., 2010. "Regulatory compliance in Lake Victoria fisheries," Environment and Development Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 15(2), pages 197-217, April.
    7. Bruno S. Frey, 2011. "Punishment – and Beyond," Contemporary Economics, University of Economics and Human Sciences in Warsaw., vol. 5(2), June.
    8. Barbier,Edward B., 2007. "Natural Resources and Economic Development," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521706513.
    9. M. Martin Boyer, 2007. "Resistance (to Fraud) Is Futile," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 74(2), pages 461-492, June.
    10. Imrohoroglu, Ayse & Merlo, Antonio & Rupert, Peter, 2000. "On the Political Economy of Income Redistribution and Crime," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 41(1), pages 1-25, February.
    11. Copeland, Brian R., 2005. "Policy Endogeneity and the Effects of Trade on the Environment," Agricultural and Resource Economics Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 34(1), pages 1-15, April.
    12. Thomas Vendryes, 2014. "Peasants Against Private Property Rights: A Review Of The Literature," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 28(5), pages 971-995, December.
    13. McCrary, Justin & Lee, David S., 2009. "The Deterrence Effect of Prison: Dynamic Theory and Evidence," Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series qt2gh1r30h, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics.
    14. Ishita Chatterjee & Ranjan Ray, 2009. "Crime, Corruption and Institutions," Monash Economics Working Papers 20-09, Monash University, Department of Economics.
    15. Steven D. Levitt, 1998. "Juvenile Crime and Punishment," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 106(6), pages 1156-1185, December.
    16. David S. Lee & Justin McCrary, 2009. "The Deterrence Effect of Prison: Dynamic Theory and Evidence," Working Papers 1171, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section..
    17. Bedard, Kelly & Helland, Eric, 2004. "The location of women's prisons and the deterrence effect of "harder" time," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(2), pages 147-167, June.
    18. Jensen, Frank & Nøstbakken, Linda, 2016. "A corporate-crime perspective on fisheries: liability rules and non-compliance," Environment and Development Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 21(3), pages 371-392, June.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:oup:oxecpp:v:57:y:2005:i:3:p:497-521. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Oxford University Press (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://academic.oup.com/oep .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.