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Inspiring Regime Change

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  • Stephen Morris
  • Mehdi Shadmehr

Abstract

We consider the problem of a leader who can assign rewards for citizens for different anti-regime actions. Citizens face a coordination problem in which each citizen has a private, endogenous degree of optimism about the likelihood of regime change. Because more optimistic citizens are easier to motivate, the choice of optimal rewards entails optimal screening. This leads to a distribution of anti-regime actions. A key result is the emergence of a vanguard, consisting of citizens who engage in the endogenous, maximum level of action. Other citizens participate at varying degrees, with less optimistic citizens contributing less. We explore how the regime’s strength or the maximum reward available to the leader influences the distribution of actions. Moreover, we show that more heterogeneity (e.g., higher inequality) among potential revolutionaries reduces the likelihood of regime change. Our methodological contribution is that we deliver a sharp and novel marriage of screening and global games.

Suggested Citation

  • Stephen Morris & Mehdi Shadmehr, 2023. "Inspiring Regime Change," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 21(6), pages 2635-2681.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:jeurec:v:21:y:2023:i:6:p:2635-2681.
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/jeea/jvad023
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    References listed on IDEAS

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