Simple contracts with adverse selection and moral hazard
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- Tal Alon & Paul Dutting & Yingkai Li & Inbal Talgam-Cohen, 2022. "Bayesian Analysis of Linear Contracts," Papers 2211.06850, arXiv.org, revised Jul 2023.
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More about this item
Keywords
principal-agent problem; contract theory; mechanism design;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-DES-2022-04-25 (Economic Design)
- NEP-HRM-2022-04-25 (Human Capital and Human Resource Management)
- NEP-MIC-2022-04-25 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-ORE-2022-04-25 (Operations Research)
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