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A theory of elite-biased democracies

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  • Boucekkine, Raouf
  • Desbordes, Rodolphe
  • Melindi-Ghidi, Paolo

Abstract

Elite-biased democracies are those democracies in which former political incumbents and their allies coordinate to impose part of the autocratic institutional rules in the new political regime. We document that this type of democratic transition is much more prevalent than the emergence of pure (popular) democracies in which the majority decides the new institutional rules. We then develop a theoretical model explaining how an elite-biased democracy may arise in an initially autocratic country. To this end, we extend the benchmark political transition model of Acemoglu and Robinson (2005) along two essential directions. First, population is split into majority versus minority groups under the initial autocratic regime. Second, the minority is an insider as it benefits from a more favourable redistribution by the autocrat. We derive conditions under which elite-biased democracies emerge and characterise them, in particular with respect to pure democracies.

Suggested Citation

  • Boucekkine, Raouf & Desbordes, Rodolphe & Melindi-Ghidi, Paolo, 2021. "A theory of elite-biased democracies," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 112(C), pages 159-166.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:112:y:2021:i:c:p:159-166
    DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2021.03.007
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    Cited by:

    1. Eberhardt, Markus, 2022. "Democracy, growth, heterogeneity, and robustness," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 147(C).
    2. Boucekkine, Raouf & Seegmuller, Thomas & Venditti, Alain, 2021. "Advances in growth and macroeconomic dynamics: In memory of Carine Nourry," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 112(C), pages 1-6.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Elite-biased democracy; Institutional change; Minority/majority; Economic favouritism; Inequality; Revolution;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games

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