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What Does The Chicago School Teach About Internet Search And The Antitrust Treatment Of Google?

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  • Robert H. Bork
  • J. Gregory Sidak

Abstract

Antitrust agencies in the United States and the European Union began investigating Google's search practices in 2010. Google's critics have consisted mainly of its competitors, particularly Microsoft, Yelp, TripAdvisor, and other search engines. They have alleged that Google is making it more difficult for them to compete by including specialized search results in general search pages and limiting access to search inputs, including “scale,” Google content, and the Android platform. Those claims contradict real-world experiences in search. They demonstrate competitors' efforts to compete not by investing in efficiency, quality, or innovation, but by using antitrust law to punish the successful competitor. The Chicago School of law and economics teaches—and the Supreme Court has long affirmed—that antitrust law exists to protect consumers, not competitors. Penalizing Google's practices as anticompetitive would violate that principle, reduce dynamic competition in search, and harm the consumers that the antitrust laws are intended to protect.

Suggested Citation

  • Robert H. Bork & J. Gregory Sidak, 2012. "What Does The Chicago School Teach About Internet Search And The Antitrust Treatment Of Google?," Journal of Competition Law and Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 8(4), pages 663-700.
  • Handle: RePEc:oup:jcomle:v:8:y:2012:i:4:p:663-700.
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/joclec/nhs031
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Daria Kostecka-Jurczyk, 2021. "Abuse of Dominant Position on Digital Market: Is the European Commission Going back to the Old Paradigm?," European Research Studies Journal, European Research Studies Journal, vol. 0(Special 1), pages 120-132.
    2. Justus Haucap & Ulrich Heimeshoff, 2014. "Google, Facebook, Amazon, eBay: Is the Internet driving competition or market monopolization?," International Economics and Economic Policy, Springer, vol. 11(1), pages 49-61, February.
    3. Haucap, Justus & Kehder, Christiane, 2014. "Stellen Google, Amazon, Facebook & Co. wirklich die marktwirtschaftliche Ordnung zur Disposition?," DICE Ordnungspolitische Perspektiven 62, Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE).
    4. Edward Iacobucci & Francesco Ducci, 2019. "The Google search case in Europe: tying and the single monopoly profit theorem in two-sided markets," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 47(1), pages 15-42, February.
    5. Justus Haucap & Christiane Kehder & Christian Kersting & Sebastian Dworschak & Alexander Skipis & Ralf Müller-Terpitz, 2014. "Marktdominanz von Google, Amazon und Co.: Diktieren die Internetfirmen die Regeln?," ifo Schnelldienst, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 67(16), pages 03-14, August.
    6. Roß Wiebke & Weghake Jens, 2015. "10 Jahre YouTube: Von dem Aufstieg einer Plattform und der Entwicklung neuer Märkte zum Kollateralschaden einer Google-Regulierung? / 10 Years YouTube: From the Arising of a Platform and the Developme," ORDO. Jahrbuch für die Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, De Gruyter, vol. 66(1), pages 195-220, January.
    7. Blanckenburg Korbinian von, 2014. "Führt Google Shopping zu einer neuen Art von Wettbewerbsproblem?," Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftspolitik, De Gruyter, vol. 63(3), pages 240-256, December.
    8. Justus Haucap & Torben Stühmeier, 2016. "Competition and antitrust in Internet markets," Chapters, in: Johannes M. Bauer & Michael Latzer (ed.), Handbook on the Economics of the Internet, chapter 9, pages 183-210, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    9. A. Douglas Melamed & Nicolas Petit, 2019. "The Misguided Assault on the Consumer Welfare Standard in the Age of Platform Markets," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 54(4), pages 741-774, June.
    10. Wiebke Roß & Jens Weghake, 2015. "10 Jahre YouTube: Von dem Aufstieg einer Plattform und der Entwicklung neuer Märkte zum Kollateralschaden einer Google-Regulierung?," TUC Working Papers in Economics 0014, Abteilung für Volkswirtschaftslehre, Technische Universität Clausthal (Department of Economics, Technical University Clausthal).
    11. Miller, Tracy, 2021. "Evaluating Arguments for Antitrust Action against Tech Companies," Annals of Computational Economics, George Mason University, Mercatus Center, May.
    12. Cong Gu & Benfu Lv & Geng Peng, 2022. "Google and Alibaba s Different Stock Performances after Antitrust Investigations, the Reasons and Enlightenment," International Journal of Economics and Financial Issues, Econjournals, vol. 12(2), pages 26-36, March.
    13. Haucap, Justus & Heimeshoff, Ulrich, 2017. "Ordnungspolitik in der digitalen Welt," DICE Ordnungspolitische Perspektiven 90, Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE).
    14. Kuchinke, Björn A. & Vidal, Miguel, 2016. "Exclusionary strategies and the rise of winner-takes-it-all markets on the Internet," Telecommunications Policy, Elsevier, vol. 40(6), pages 582-592.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • A12 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - Relation of Economics to Other Disciplines
    • D40 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - General
    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • L20 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - General
    • L40 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - General
    • O31 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives

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