Monetary Union in West Africa: An Agency of Restraint for Fiscal Policies?
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- Ms. Catherine A Pattillo & Mr. Paul R Masson, 2001. "Monetary Union in West Africa: An Agency of Restraint for Fiscal Policies?," IMF Working Papers 2001/034, International Monetary Fund.
References listed on IDEAS
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