IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/oup/econjl/v133y2023i649p159-200..html
   My bibliography  Save this article

On Target? Sanctions and the Economic Interests of Elite Policymakers in Iran

Author

Listed:
  • Mirko Draca
  • Jason Garred
  • Leanne Stickland
  • Nele Warrinnier

Abstract

How successful are sanctions at targeting the economic interests of political elites in affected countries? We study the case of Iran, using information on the stock exchange-listed assets of two specific political entities with significant influence over the direction of Iran’s nuclear programme. Our identification strategy focuses on the process of negotiations for sanctions removal, examining which interests benefit most from news about diplomatic progress. The results indicate the ‘bluntness’ of sanctions on Iran, but also provide evidence of their effectiveness in generating substantial economic incentives for elite policymakers to negotiate a deal for sanctions relief.

Suggested Citation

  • Mirko Draca & Jason Garred & Leanne Stickland & Nele Warrinnier, 2023. "On Target? Sanctions and the Economic Interests of Elite Policymakers in Iran," The Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 133(649), pages 159-200.
  • Handle: RePEc:oup:econjl:v:133:y:2023:i:649:p:159-200.
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/ej/ueac042
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Massimo Guidolin & Eliana La Ferrara, 2007. "Diamonds Are Forever, Wars Are Not: Is Conflict Bad for Private Firms?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(5), pages 1978-1993, December.
    2. Andrew B Abel & Stavros Panageas, 2022. "An Analytic Framework for Interpreting Investment Regressions in the Presence of Financial Constraints," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 35(9), pages 4055-4104.
    3. Coulomb, Renaud & Sangnier, Marc, 2014. "The impact of political majorities on firm value: Do electoral promises or friendship connections matter?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 115(C), pages 158-170.
    4. David Roodman & James G. MacKinnon & Morten Ørregaard Nielsen & Matthew D. Webb, 2019. "Fast and wild: Bootstrap inference in Stata using boottest," Stata Journal, StataCorp LP, vol. 19(1), pages 4-60, March.
    5. Nikolay Marinov, 2005. "Do Economic Sanctions Destabilize Country Leaders?," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 49(3), pages 564-576, July.
    6. Coulomb, Renaud & Sangnier, Marc, 2014. "The impact of political majorities on firm value: Do electoral promises or friendship connections matter?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 115(C), pages 158-170.
    7. Chang-Tai Hsieh & Enrico Moretti, 2006. "Did Iraq Cheat the United Nations? Underpricing, Bribes, and the Oil for Food Program," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 121(4), pages 1211-1248.
    8. Eli Berman & Jacob N. Shapiro & Joseph H. Felter, 2011. "Can Hearts and Minds Be Bought? The Economics of Counterinsurgency in Iraq," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 119(4), pages 766-819.
    9. Knight*, Brian, 2007. "Are policy platforms capitalized into equity prices? Evidence from the Bush/Gore 2000 Presidential Election," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(1-2), pages 389-409, February.
    10. Paul C. Tetlock, 2007. "Giving Content to Investor Sentiment: The Role of Media in the Stock Market," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 62(3), pages 1139-1168, June.
    11. Iacus, Stefano M. & King, Gary & Porro, Giuseppe, 2012. "Causal Inference without Balance Checking: Coarsened Exact Matching," Political Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 20(1), pages 1-24, January.
    12. Tim Loughran & Bill Mcdonald, 2011. "When Is a Liability Not a Liability? Textual Analysis, Dictionaries, and 10‐Ks," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 66(1), pages 35-65, February.
    13. Renaud Coulomb & Marc Sangnier, 2014. "The Impact of Political Majorities on Firm Value: Do Electoral Promises or Friendship Connections Matter?," PSE Working Papers halshs-00990241, HAL.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Jerg Gutmann & Matthias Neuenkirch & Florian Neumeier, 2024. "Do China and Russia undermine Western sanctions? Evidence from DiD and event study estimation," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 32(1), pages 132-160, February.
    2. Aldunate, Felipe & Gonzalez, Felipe & Prem, Mounu, 2021. "Make the Economy Scream? U.S. Banks and Foreign Firms During the Cold War," SocArXiv bhwk7, Center for Open Science.
    3. Gutmann, Jerg & Neuenkirch, Matthias & Neumeier, Florian, 2023. "The economic effects of international sanctions: An event study," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(4), pages 1214-1231.
    4. Gutmann, Jerg & Neuenkirch, Matthias & Neumeier, Florian, 2024. "Political economy of international sanctions," ILE Working Paper Series 81, University of Hamburg, Institute of Law and Economics.
    5. Fengze Han & Runliang Li & Sen Ma & Tzu‐Chang Forrest Cheng, 2025. "Deterrent effects of targeted sanctions by mainland China on Taiwan: evidence from 2021–2 sanction events," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 92(365), pages 259-284, January.
    6. de Souza, Gustavo & Hu, Naiyuan & Li, Haishi & Mei, Yuan, 2024. "(Trade) War and peace: How to impose international trade sanctions," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 146(C).
    7. Aldunate, Felipe & González, Felipe & Prem, Mounu, 2024. "The limits of hegemony: U.S. banks and Chilean firms in the Cold War," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 166(C).

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Draca, Mirko & Garred, Jason & Stickland, Leanne & Warrinnier, Nele, 2018. "On Target? The Incidence of Sanctions Across Listed Firms in Iran," CAGE Online Working Paper Series 372, Competitive Advantage in the Global Economy (CAGE).
    2. repec:lic:licosd:41319 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Fenske, James & Wang, Shizhuo, 2023. "Tradition and mortality: Evidence from twin infanticide in Africa," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 163(C).
    4. Thomas Bourveau & Renaud Coulomb & Marc Sangnier, 2021. "Political Connections and White-Collar Crime: Evidence from Insider Trading in France," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 19(5), pages 2543-2576.
    5. Guilhem Cassan & Marc Sangnier, 2022. "The impact of 2020 French municipal elections on the spread of COVID-19," Journal of Population Economics, Springer;European Society for Population Economics, vol. 35(3), pages 963-988, July.
    6. Guilhem Cassan & Marc Sangnier, 2020. "Liberté, Egalité, Fraternité... Contaminé? Estimating the impact of French municipal elections on COVID-19 spread in France," Working Papers halshs-02877917, HAL.
    7. Luechinger, Simon & Moser, Christoph, 2014. "The value of the revolving door: Political appointees and the stock market," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 119(C), pages 93-107.
    8. Alhashel, Bader S., 2020. "Hail to the chief: The effect of political alignment with the presidency on corporate investment," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 54(C).
    9. Kostakis, Alexandros & Mu, Liangyi & Otsubo, Yoichi, 2023. "Detecting political event risk in the option market," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 146(C).
    10. Lehrer, Nimrod David, 2018. "The value of political connections in a multiparty parliamentary democracy: Evidence from the 2015 elections in Israel," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 53(C), pages 13-58.
    11. Audinga Baltrunaite, 2020. "Political Contributions and Public Procurement: Evidence from Lithuania," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 18(2), pages 541-582.
    12. Coulomb, Renaud & Sangnier, Marc, 2014. "The impact of political majorities on firm value: Do electoral promises or friendship connections matter?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 115(C), pages 158-170.
    13. Martinez-Carrasco, José & ConceiçaÞo, Otavio & Dezolt, Ana Lúcia, 2023. "More Information, Lower Price? Access Market-based Reference Prices and Gains in Public Procurement Efficiency," IDB Publications (Working Papers) 12754, Inter-American Development Bank.
    14. Brice Fabre & Marc Sangnier, 2017. "What Motivates French Pork: Political Career Concerns or Private Connections?," AMSE Working Papers 1705, Aix-Marseille School of Economics, France.
    15. Brice Fabre & Marc Sangnier, 2022. "Where do politicians send pork? Evidence from central government transfers to French municipalities," DeFiPP Working Papers 2202, University of Namur, Development Finance and Public Policies.
    16. Stefano DellaVigna & Ruben Durante & Brian Knight & Eliana La Ferrara, 2016. "Market-Based Lobbying: Evidence from Advertising Spending in Italy," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, vol. 8(1), pages 224-256, January.
    17. David Kreitmeir & Nathan Lane & Paul A. Raschky, 2020. "The Value of Names - Civil Society, Information, and Governing Multinationals on the Global Periphery," SoDa Laboratories Working Paper Series 2020-10, Monash University, SoDa Laboratories.
    18. Stéphane Benveniste & Renaud Coulomb & Marc Sangnier, 2022. "The (Market) Value of State Honors," AMSE Working Papers 2201, Aix-Marseille School of Economics, France.
    19. Gustav Axén & Dominic Cortis, 2020. "Hedging on Betting Markets," Risks, MDPI, vol. 8(3), pages 1-14, August.
    20. Labonne, Julien, 2016. "Local political business cycles: Evidence from Philippine municipalities," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 121(C), pages 56-62.
    21. Brice Fabre & Marc Sangnier, 2024. "Where and why do politicians send pork? Evidence from central government transfers to French municipalities," Institut des Politiques Publiques halshs-04687331, HAL.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:oup:econjl:v:133:y:2023:i:649:p:159-200.. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Oxford University Press or the person in charge (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/resssea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.