The Good, the Bad, and the Regulator: An Experimental Test of Two Conditional Audit Schemes
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- Timothy N. Cason & Lata Gangadharan, 2006.
"An Experimental Study of Compliance and Leverage in Auditing and Regulatory Enforcement,"
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"Can whistleblower programs reduce tax evasion? Experimental evidence,"
Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 83(C).
- David Masclet & Claude Montmarquette & Nathalie Viennot-Briot, 2018. "Can Whistleblower Programs Reduce Tax Evasion? Experimental Evidence," Economics Working Paper Archive (University of Rennes & University of Caen) 2018-11, Center for Research in Economics and Management (CREM), University of Rennes, University of Caen and CNRS.
- David Masclet & Claude Montmarquette & Nathalie Viennot-Briot, 2019. "Can Whistleblower Programs Reduce Tax Evasion? Experimental Evidence," Post-Print halshs-02301968, HAL.
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- Ralph-C Bayer & Frank Cowell, 2006. "Tax Compliance and Firms' Strategic Interdependence," School of Economics and Public Policy Working Papers 2006-09, University of Adelaide, School of Economics and Public Policy.
- Ralph Bayer & Frank A Cowell, 2006. "Tax Compliance and Firms’ StrategicInterdependence," STICERD - Distributional Analysis Research Programme Papers 81, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
- Li-Chen Hsu, 2013. "Tax Auditing as a Public Good Game: An Experimental Study on Punishment and Compliance," Pacific Economic Review, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 18(4), pages 475-501, October.
- Heike Hennig‐Schmidt & Hendrik Jürges & Daniel Wiesen, 2019.
"Dishonesty in health care practice: A behavioral experiment on upcoding in neonatology,"
Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 28(3), pages 319-338, March.
- Hennig-Schmidt, Heike & Jürges, Hendrik & Wiesen, Daniel, 2018. "Dishonesty in healthcare practice: A behavioral experiment on upcoding in neonatology," HERO Online Working Paper Series 2018:3, University of Oslo, Health Economics Research Programme.
- Vossler, Christian A. & Gilpatric, Scott M., 2018. "Endogenous audits, uncertainty, and taxpayer assistance services: Theory and experiments," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 165(C), pages 217-229.
- Christian A. Vossler & Scott M. Gilpatric, 2017. "Endogenous Tax Audits and Taxpayer Assistance Services: Theory and Experiments," Working Papers 2017-01, University of Tennessee, Department of Economics.
- Meinarni Asnawi, 2016. "Tax Compliance Decision Analysis: Audit Strategy, Audit Rate, Perceived Probability of Audit, and Taxpayer Ethics," Information Management and Business Review, AMH International, vol. 8(3), pages 11-21.
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- Lindeboom, Maarten & van der Klaauw, Bas & Vriend, Sandra, 2020. "Audit regimes in long-term care," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 176(C), pages 272-298.
- Gilpatric, Scott M. & Vossler, Christian A. & Liu, Lirong, 2015. "Using competition to stimulate regulatory compliance: A tournament-based dynamic targeting mechanism," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 119(C), pages 182-196.
- Earnhart, Dietrich & Friesen, Lana, 2021. "Use of competitive endogenous audit mechanisms by federal and state inspectors within environmental protection agencies," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 109(C).
- Yoshio Kamijo & Takehito Masuda & Hiroshi Uemura, 2015. "Who is audited? Experimental study on rule-based and human tax auditing schemes," Working Papers SDES-2015-9, Kochi University of Technology, School of Economics and Management, revised Jan 2015.
- Evan M. Calford & Gregory DeAngelo, 2023. "Ambiguity and enforcement," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 26(2), pages 304-338, April.
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Chapters, in: Ananish Chaudhuri (ed.), A Research Agenda for Experimental Economics, chapter 4, pages 69-92,
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- Timothy N. Cason & Lana Friesen & Lata Gangadharan, 2020. "Complying with Environmental Regulations: Experimental Evidence," Discussion Papers Series 637, School of Economics, University of Queensland, Australia.
- Lindeboom, Maarten & van der Klaauw, Bas & Vriend, Sandra, 2016. "Audit rates and compliance: A field experiment in care provision," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 131(PB), pages 160-173.
- Lindeboom, Maarten & van der Klaauw, Bas & Vriend, Sandra, 2014.
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- Maarten Lindeboom & Bas van der Klaauw & Sandra Vriend, 2014. "Audit Rates and Compliance: A Field Experiment in Long-term Care," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 14-038/V, Tinbergen Institute.
- Tan, Fangfang & Yim, Andrew, 2014.
"Can strategic uncertainty help deter tax evasion? An experiment on auditing rules,"
Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 40(C), pages 161-174.
- Fangfang Tan & Andrew Yim, 2011. "Can Strategic Uncertainty Help Deter Tax Evasion? – An Experiment on Auditing Rules," Working Papers can_strategic_uncertainty, Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance.
- Batrancea, Larissa & Nichita, Anca & Olsen, Jerome & Kogler, Christoph & Kirchler, Erich & Hoelzl, Erik & Weiss, Avi & Torgler, Benno & Fooken, Jonas & Fuller, Joanne & Schaffner, Markus & Banuri, She, 2019. "Trust and power as determinants of tax compliance across 44 nations," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 74(C).
- Coria, Jessica & Zhang, Xiao-Bing, 2015. "The Harrington Paradox Squared," Working Papers in Economics 608, University of Gothenburg, Department of Economics.
More about this item
JEL classification:
- C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
- H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion and Avoidance
- K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
- L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
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