Endogenous Tax Audits and Taxpayer Assistance Services: Theory and Experiments
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Cited by:
- Luigi Mittone & Matteo Ploner & Eugenio Verrina, 2021.
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Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 57(3), pages 591-615, October.
- Luigi Mittone & Matteo Ploner & Eugenio Verrina, 2017. "When the State Doesn't Play Dice: Aggressive Audit Strategies Foster Tax Compliance," CEEL Working Papers 1702, Cognitive and Experimental Economics Laboratory, Department of Economics, University of Trento, Italia.
- Luigi Mittone & Matteo Ploner & Eugenio Verrina, 2021. "When the state does not play dice: aggressive audit strategies foster tax compliance," Post-Print halshs-03240743, HAL.
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More about this item
Keywords
individual income tax; taxpayer assistance services; endogenous audits; tax reporting and enforcement; experimental methods;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
- D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
- H24 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Personal Income and Other Nonbusiness Taxes and Subsidies
- H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion and Avoidance
- H83 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - Public Administration
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-ACC-2017-04-09 (Accounting and Auditing)
- NEP-EXP-2017-04-09 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-IUE-2017-04-09 (Informal and Underground Economics)
- NEP-PBE-2017-04-09 (Public Economics)
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