Entitlement Effects, Unemployment Insurance and Employment Decisions
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Citations
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Cited by:
- Helge Bennmarker & Kenneth Carling & Bertil Holmlund, 2007.
"Do Benefit Hikes Damage Job Finding? Evidence from Swedish Unemployment Insurance Reforms,"
LABOUR, CEIS, vol. 21(1), pages 85-120, March.
- Helge Bennmarker & Kenneth Carling & Bertil Holmlund, 2005. "Do Benefit Hikes Damage Job Finding? Evidence from Swedish Unemployment Insurance Reforms," CESifo Working Paper Series 1460, CESifo.
- Bennmarker, Helge & Carling, Kenneth & Holmlund, Bertil, 2005. "Do benefit hikes damage job finding? Evidence from Swedish unemployment insurance reforms," Working Paper Series 2005:22, IFAU - Institute for Evaluation of Labour Market and Education Policy.
- Bennmarker, Helge & Carling, Kenneth & Holmlund, Bertil, 2005. "Do Benefit Hikes Damage Job Finding? Evidence from Swedish Unemployment Insurance Reforms," Working Paper Series 2005:15, Uppsala University, Department of Economics.
- Olivia S. Mitchell, "undated".
"Retirement Systems in Developed and Developing Countries: Institutional Features, Economic Effects, and Lessons for Economies in Transition,"
Pension Research Council Working Papers
94-3, Wharton School Pension Research Council, University of Pennsylvania.
- Olivia S. Mitchell, 1993. "Retirement Systems in Developed and Developing Countries: Institutional Features, Economic Effects, and Lessons for Economies in Transition," NBER Working Papers 4424, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Bernardus Van Doornik & Dimas Fazio & David Schoenherr & Janis Skrastins, 2022.
"Unemployment Insurance as a Subsidy to Risky Firms,"
The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 35(12), pages 5535-5595.
- Bernardus Ferdinandus Nazar Van Doornik & Dimas Mateus Fazio & David Schoenherr & Janis Skrastins, 2020. "Unemployment Insurance as a Subsidy to Risky Firms," Working Papers Series 523, Central Bank of Brazil, Research Department.
- Bernardus Van Doornik & Dimas Fazio & David Schoenherr & Janis Skrastins, 2022. "Unemployment Insurance as a Subsidy to Risky Firms," Working Papers 2022-1, Princeton University. Economics Department..
- Michael Baker & Samuel A. Rea, 1998.
"Employment Spells And Unemployment Insurance Eligibility Requirements,"
The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 80(1), pages 80-94, February.
- Michael Baker & Samuel A. Rea, Jr., 1994. "Employment Spells and Unemployment Insurance Eligibility Requirements," Working Papers reas-95-02, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
- Michael Baker & Rea Samuel A. Rea, 1995. "Employment Spells and Unemployment Insurance Eligibility Requirements," Labor and Demography 9505001, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Andolfatto, David & Gomme, Paul, 1996. "Unemployment insurance and labor-market activity in Canada," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 44(1), pages 47-82, June.
- Miquel Faig, 2008.
"Labor Market Cycles and Unemployment Insurance Eligibility,"
2008 Meeting Papers
183, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Miquel Faig & Min Zhang, 2010. "Labor Market Cycles and Unemployment Insurance Eligibility," Working Papers tecipa-404, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
- Daniel S. Hamermesh, 1980. "Transfers, Taxes, and the NAIRU," NBER Working Papers 0548, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Miquel Faig & Min Zhang, 2012.
"Labor Market Cycles, Unemployment Insurance Eligibility, and Moral Hazard,"
Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 15(1), pages 41-56, January.
- Miquel Faig & Min Zhang, 2011. "Code files for " Labor Market Cycles, Unemployment Insurance Eligibility, and Moral Hazard Corresponding"," Computer Codes 10-112, Review of Economic Dynamics.
- Robert A. Moffitt, 2014.
"Unemployment benefits and unemployment,"
IZA World of Labor, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA), pages 1-13, May.
- Robert Moffitt & Wonsik Ko, . "Unemployment benefits and unemployment," IZA World of Labor, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA), pages 132-132, June.
- Sattinger, Michael, 1995.
"General Equilibrium Effects of Unemployment Compensation with Labor Force Participation,"
Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 13(4), pages 623-652, October.
- Michael Sattinger, 1993. "General Equilibrium Effects of Unemployment Compensation with Labor Force Participation," Discussion Papers 93-03, University at Albany, SUNY, Department of Economics.
- Min Zhang, 2010. "Unemployment Insurance Eligibility, Moral Hazard and Equilibrium Unemployment," Working Papers tecipa-405, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
- Barbara L. Wolfe, 1985. "Cutbacks in Disability Transfer Programs," Evaluation Review, , vol. 9(3), pages 263-280, June.
- Cullen, Julie Berry & Gruber, Jonathan, 2000. "Does Unemployment Insurance Crowd Out Spousal Labor Supply?," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 18(3), pages 546-572, July.
- Vijlbrief, J.A., 1990. "The effects of unemployment insurance on the labour market," Serie Research Memoranda 0031, VU University Amsterdam, Faculty of Economics, Business Administration and Econometrics.
- Bernardus Van Doornik & David Schoenherr & Janis Skrastins, 2018. "Unemployment Insurance, Strategic Unemployment and Firm-Worker Collusion," Working Papers Series 483, Central Bank of Brazil, Research Department.
- Kettunen, Juha, 2002. "Labour mobility of unemployed workers," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(3), pages 359-380, May.
- Christofides, Louis N & McKenna, C J, 1996. "Unemployment Insurance and Job Duration in Canada," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 14(2), pages 286-312, April.
- François Gerard & Gustavo Gonzaga, 2013. "Informal Labor and the Cost of Social Programs: Evidence from 15 Years of Unemployment Insurance in Brazil," Textos para discussão 608, Department of Economics PUC-Rio (Brazil).
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