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The Political Economy of Migration Enforcement: Domestic Versus Border Control

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  • Giovanni Facchini
  • Cecilia Testa

Abstract

We study migration policy enforcement by an elected government. The policymaker faces uncertainty on the supply of migrants, but has more information than the public on its preferences and the extent and effectiveness of its enforcement activities. We show that a utilitarian government preferring more migrants than the majority may find it optimal to set a restrictive target to please the median voter, while relaxing its enforcement to admit more foreigners in a concealed way. Lax enforcement may be achieved either by deploying inadequate resources on cost-effective activities (domestic enforcement) or by allocating a larger budget on less effective tools (border enforcement). The attractiveness of one instrument over the other depends on the size of the immigrant flow: if the supply is large, border enforcement might be preferred because, although more costly, it brings the number of migrants closer to the utilitarian optimum. Hence, re-election concerns might provide a rationale for the widespread use of less effective enforcement tool, such as border control. (JEL codes: F22 and J61)

Suggested Citation

  • Giovanni Facchini & Cecilia Testa, 2015. "The Political Economy of Migration Enforcement: Domestic Versus Border Control," CESifo Economic Studies, CESifo Group, vol. 61(3-4), pages 701-721.
  • Handle: RePEc:oup:cesifo:v:61:y:2015:i:3-4:p:701-721.
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/cesifo/ifv005
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    Cited by:

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    2. Levy, Gilat & Razin, Ronny, 2018. "Immigration into Prejudiced Societies: Segregation and Echo Chambers effects," CEPR Discussion Papers 12630, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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    4. Slobodan Djajić, 2017. "Transit migration," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 25(5), pages 1017-1045, November.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • F22 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business - - - International Migration
    • J61 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Geographic Labor Mobility; Immigrant Workers

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