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The Anatomy of Corporate Control: Directors, Shareholders and Executive Remuneration in Giant U.S. and U.K. Corporations

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  • Cosh, A D
  • Hughes, A

Abstract

This paper provides a contemporary comparison of the anatomy of corporate contol in giant U.S. and U.K. corporations. The comparison draws upon an analysis of share ownership, executive remuneration, board membership, and the patterns of interlocking directorships. The results are of significance not only for the managerialist hypothesis, but also for the wider issues concerning the control and behavior of these giant corporations. The evidence presented leads to some qualifications of the managerialist position. Furthermore, the study identifies the potentially key role played by nonexecutiv e directors, particularly where their board membership is associated with significant shareholdings of financial institutions. Copyright 1987 by Oxford University Press.

Suggested Citation

  • Cosh, A D & Hughes, A, 1987. "The Anatomy of Corporate Control: Directors, Shareholders and Executive Remuneration in Giant U.S. and U.K. Corporations," Cambridge Journal of Economics, Cambridge Political Economy Society, vol. 11(4), pages 285-313, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:cambje:v:11:y:1987:i:4:p:285-313
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. A Cosh & P Guest & A Hughes, 2001. "Managerial Discretion and Takeover Performance," Working Papers wp216, Centre for Business Research, University of Cambridge.
    2. Ang, James S. & Constand, Richard L., 1997. "Compensation and performance: the case of Japanese managers and directors," Journal of Multinational Financial Management, Elsevier, vol. 7(4), pages 275-304, December.
    3. Andy Cosh & Paul Guest & Alan Hughes, 2007. "UK Corporate Governance and Takeover Performance," Working Papers wp357, Centre for Business Research, University of Cambridge.
    4. Wu, Chloe Yu-Hsuan & Hsu, Hwa-Hsien, 2018. "Founders and board structure: Evidence from UK IPO firms," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 56(C), pages 19-31.
    5. Abell, Peter & Samuels, J. & Cranna, M., 1994. "Mergers, motivation and directors' remuneration," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 20827, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    6. Hristos Doucouliagos & Janto Haman & T.D. Stanley, 2012. "Pay for Performance and Corporate Governance Reform," Industrial Relations: A Journal of Economy and Society, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 51(3), pages 670-703, July.
    7. Hearn, Bruce, 2013. "The determinants of director remuneration, executive tenure and individual executive disclosure in North African IPO firms," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 27(1), pages 162-182.
    8. Guest, Paul M., 2008. "The determinants of board size and composition: Evidence from the UK," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 51-72, February.
    9. P Abell & M Cranna & J Samuels, 1994. "Mergers," CEP Discussion Papers dp0199, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
    10. Cosh, Andy & Hughes, Alan, 1997. "Executive remuneration, executive dismissal and institutional shareholdings," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 15(4), pages 469-492, July.
    11. Firth, M. & Tam, M. & Tang, M., 1999. "The determinants of top management pay," Omega, Elsevier, vol. 27(6), pages 617-635, December.
    12. Andy Cosh & Paul M. Guest & Alan Hughes, 2006. "Board Share‐Ownership and Takeover Performance," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 33(3‐4), pages 459-510, April.

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