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Price Behavior in a Dynamic Oligopsony: Washington Processing Potatoes

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  • Timothy J. Richards
  • Paul M. Patterson
  • Ram N. Acharya

Abstract

Punishment strategies are necessary to sustain a collusive oligopsony in a repeated game context when demand is uncertain and only market variables are observable. This article proposes a test for tacit collusion among potato processors in Washington state using a dynamic regime-switching model estimated with a finite mixture method. The results support the existence of punishment and collusive regimes and show the welfare losses due to anti-competitive behavior on the part of processors to be significant. Processors' oligopsony power is enhanced by higher domestic production, imports, and existing stocks, but it is ameliorated by high capacity utilization rates and exports. Copyright 2001, Oxford University Press.

Suggested Citation

  • Timothy J. Richards & Paul M. Patterson & Ram N. Acharya, 2001. "Price Behavior in a Dynamic Oligopsony: Washington Processing Potatoes," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 83(2), pages 259-271.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:ajagec:v:83:y:2001:i:2:p:259-271
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1111/0002-9092.00154
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    1. Piotr Borawski & Marta Guth & Wojciech Truszkowski & Dagmara Zuzek & Aneta Beldycka-Borawska & Bartosz Mickiewicz & Elzbieta Szymanska & Jayson Kennedy Harper & James William Dunn, 2020. "Milk price changes in Poland in the context of the Common Agricultural Policy," Agricultural Economics, Czech Academy of Agricultural Sciences, vol. 66(1), pages 19-26.
    2. Mohammad Omrani & Mohammad Nabi Shahiki Tash & Ahmad Akbari, 2017. "Price Transmission in Iranian Wholesale-retail Meat Market: Implications for Market Power," International Journal of Economics and Financial Issues, Econjournals, vol. 7(3), pages 594-601.
    3. Dimitri, Carolyn & Jaenicke, Edward C., 2001. "Cash Market Or Contract? How Technology And Consumer Demand Influence The Decision," 2001 Annual meeting, August 5-8, Chicago, IL 20723, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
    4. Natalya Shelkova, 2015. "Low-Wage Labor Markets and the Power of Suggestion," Review of Social Economy, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 73(1), pages 61-88, March.
    5. Patrice Bougette & Oliver Budzinski & Frédéric Marty, 2019. "Exploitative Abuse and Abuse of Economic Dependence: What Can We Learn From an Industrial Organization Approach?," Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 129(2), pages 261-286.
    6. Guci, Ledia & Brown, Mark G., 2007. "Changes in the Structure of the Florida Processed Orange Industry and Potential Impacts on Competition," Research papers 36811, Florida Department of Citrus.
    7. Zhang, Mingxia & Sexton, Richard J. & Alston, Julian M., 2002. "Does Branded Food Product Advertising Help Or Hurt Farmers?," Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Western Agricultural Economics Association, vol. 27(2), pages 1-25, December.
    8. Sheldon, Ian M., 2017. "The Competitiveness Of Agricultural Product And Input Markets: A Review And Synthesis Of Recent Research," Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 49(1), pages 1-44, February.
    9. Natalya Y. Shelkova, 2008. "Low-wage labor markets amd the power of suggestion," Working Papers 1112, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section..
    10. Liang, Jing, 2010. "Three essays on food safety and foodborne illness," ISU General Staff Papers 201001010800002782, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
    11. Ani L. Katchova & Ian M. Sheldon & Mario J. Miranda, 2005. "A dynamic model of oligopoly and oligopsony in the U.S. potato-processing industry," Agribusiness, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 21(3), pages 409-428.
    12. Aaron Grau & Heinrich Hockmann, 2018. "Market power in the German dairy value chain," Agribusiness, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 34(1), pages 93-111, December.
    13. Alessandro Bonanno & Carlo Russo & Luisa Menapace, 2018. "Market power and bargaining in agrifood markets: A review of emerging topics and tools," Agribusiness, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 34(1), pages 6-23, December.
    14. Melissa Carlson & Barbara Koremenos, 2021. "Cooperation Failure or Secret Collusion? Absolute Monarchs and Informal Cooperation," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 16(1), pages 95-135, January.
    15. Tiffin, J. Richard, 2006. "Dynamic Strategic Behaviour in the Deregulated England and Wales Liquid Milk Market," 2006 Annual Meeting, August 12-18, 2006, Queensland, Australia 25282, International Association of Agricultural Economists.
    16. Hueth, Brent & Ligon, Ethan & Dimitri, Carolyn, 2007. "AJAE Appendix: Agricultural Contracts: Data and Research Needs," American Journal of Agricultural Economics APPENDICES, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 89(5), pages 1-7, December.
    17. Jared G. Carlberg & Robert J. Hogan & Clement E. Ward, 2009. "Game theory application to Fed Cattle procurement in an experimental market," Agribusiness, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 25(1), pages 56-69.

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