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The Information Confidentiality And Cyber Security In Medical Institutions

Author

Listed:
  • SABAU-POPA CLAUDIA DIANA

    (Universitatea din Oradea,)

  • BRADEA IOANA

    (ACADEMIA DE STUDII ECONOMICE BUCURESTI,)

  • BOLOS MARCEL IOAN

    (UNIVERSITATEA DIN ORADEA,)

  • DELCEA CAMELIA

    (ACADEMIA DE STUDII ECONOMICE BUCURESTI,)

Abstract

The information confidentiality and cyber security risk affects the right to confidentiality and privacy of the patient, as regulated in Romania by the Law 46/2002. The manifestation of the cyber security risk event affects the reputation of the healthcare institution and is becoming more and more complex and often due to the: development of network technology, the medical equipment connected to wifi and the electronic databases. The databases containing medical records were implemented due to automation. Thus, transforming data into medical knowledge contribute to a better understanding of the disease. Due to these factors, the measures taken by the hospital management for this type of risk are adapted to the cyber changes. The hospital objectives aim: the implementation of a robust information system, the early threats identifications and the incident reporting. Neglecting this type of risk can generate financial loss, inability to continue providing health care services for a certain period of time, providing an erroneous diagnosis, medical equipment errors etc. Thus, in a digital age the appropriate risk management for the information security and cyber risk represent a necessity. The main concern of hospitals worldwide is to align with international requirements and obtain credentials in terms of data security from the International Organisation for Standardization, which regulates the management of this type of risk. Romania is at the beginning in terms of concerns regarding the management, avoidance and mitigation of information security, the health system being most highly exposed to its manifestation. The present paper examines the concerns of the health system to the confidentiality of information and cyber security risk and its management arrangements. Thus, a set of key risk indicators is implemented and monitored for 2011-2013, using a user interface, a Dashboard, which acts as an early warning system of the manifestation of the risk event in a hospital from western Romania.

Suggested Citation

  • Sabau-Popa Claudia Diana & Bradea Ioana & Bolos Marcel Ioan & Delcea Camelia, 2015. "The Information Confidentiality And Cyber Security In Medical Institutions," Annals of Faculty of Economics, University of Oradea, Faculty of Economics, vol. 1(1), pages 855-864, July.
  • Handle: RePEc:ora:journl:v:1:y:2015:i:1:p:855-864
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    information security; cyber security; hospital Dashboard; indicators;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • I10 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - General
    • M10 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Administration - - - General

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