Separating moral hazard from adverse selection in automobile insurance: Longitudinal evidence from France
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- Dionne, G. & Michaud, P.C. & Dahchour, M., 2004. "Separating Moral Hazard from Adverse Selection in Automobile Insurance : Longitudinal Evidence from France," Other publications TiSEM 5839bf89-1c99-413b-94b3-6, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- Georges Dionne & Pierre-Carl Michaud & Maki Dahchour, 2004. "Separating Moral Hazard from Adverse Selection in Automobile Insurance: Longitudinal Evidence from France," Cahiers de recherche 0420, CIRPEE.
- Dionne, G. & Michaud, P.C. & Dahchour, M., 2004. "Separating Moral Hazard from Adverse Selection in Automobile Insurance : Longitudinal Evidence from France," Discussion Paper 2004-79, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
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Citations
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Cited by:
- Martin Spindler & Joachim Winter & Steffen Hagmayer, 2014.
"Asymmetric Information in the Market for Automobile Insurance: Evidence From Germany,"
Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 81(4), pages 781-801, December.
- Spindler, Martin & Winter, Joachim & Hagmayer, Steffen, 2012. "Asymmetric Information in the Market for Automobile Insurance: Evidence from Germany," MEA discussion paper series 201208, Munich Center for the Economics of Aging (MEA) at the Max Planck Institute for Social Law and Social Policy.
- Dionne, Georges & Michaud, Pierre-Carl & Pinquet, Jean, 2013.
"A review of recent theoretical and empirical analyses of asymmetric information in road safety and automobile insurance,"
Research in Transportation Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 85-97.
- Georges Dionnne & Pierre-Carl Michaud & Jean Pinquet, 2012. "A Review of Recent Theoretical and Empirical Analyses of Asymmetric Information in Road Safety and Automobile Insurance," Cahiers de recherche 1204, CIRPEE.
- Dionne, Georges & Michaud, Pierre-Carl & Pinquet, Jean, 2012. "A review of recent theoretical and empirical analyses of asymmetric information in road safety and automobile insurance," Working Papers 12-1, HEC Montreal, Canada Research Chair in Risk Management.
- Yarmukhamedov, Sherzod, 2013. "Empirical analysis of moral hazard: a study of a vehicle insurance tax reform," Working papers in Transport Economics 2013:14, CTS - Centre for Transport Studies Stockholm (KTH and VTI).
- Ciprian MatiÅŸ & Eugenia MatiÅŸ, 2013. "Asymmetric Information In Insurance Field: Some General Considerations," Annales Universitatis Apulensis Series Oeconomica, Faculty of Sciences, "1 Decembrie 1918" University, Alba Iulia, vol. 1(15), pages 1-17.
- C. P. Gupta & Arushi Jain, 2022. "A Study of Banks’ Systemic Importance and Moral Hazard Behaviour: A Panel Threshold Regression Approach," JRFM, MDPI, vol. 15(11), pages 1-23, November.
- Imen Karaa, 2018. "Moral Hazard and Learning in the Tunisian Automobile Insurance Market: New Evidence from Dynamic Data," The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance - Issues and Practice, Palgrave Macmillan;The Geneva Association, vol. 43(3), pages 560-589, July.
- Chu‐Shiu Li & Chwen‐Chi Liu & Jia‐Hsing Yeh, 2007. "The Incentive Effects of Increasing Per‐Claim Deductible Contracts in Automobile Insurance," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 74(2), pages 441-459, June.
- Lilia Filipova, 2007. "Monitoring and Privacy in Automobile Insurance Markets with Moral Hazard," Discussion Paper Series 293, Universitaet Augsburg, Institute for Economics.
- Lilia Filipova, 2007. "Monitoring and Privacy in Automobile Insurance Markets with Moral Hazard," Working Papers 026, Bavarian Graduate Program in Economics (BGPE).
- repec:mea:meawpa:12259 is not listed on IDEAS
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More about this item
Keywords
Automobile insurance; road safety; asymmetric information; experience rating; moral hazard; adverse selection; dynamic panel data models; Granger causality test;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C23 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Single Equation Models; Single Variables - - - Models with Panel Data; Spatio-temporal Models
- D80 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - General
- G22 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Insurance; Insurance Companies; Actuarial Studies
- L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
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