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An Analysis of the Use of Money to Divert the Exercise of Government Power for the Wealthiest

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  • Austin Murphy

    (Oakland University)

Abstract

This paper utilizes a simple mathematical model of the relationship between wealth and political power to indicate the extent to which the wealthiest agents can control government leaders through their investments in politicians and parties that enable them to maximize their return on this political capital just as they do with any commercial investments. This power over government policies is shown to sometimes be efficiently facilitated at the lowest cost through focusing voter choices on divisive issues. The control of government by private elites is demonstrated to be largely unhindered by any feasible limitations on political spending.

Suggested Citation

  • Austin Murphy, 2020. "An Analysis of the Use of Money to Divert the Exercise of Government Power for the Wealthiest," Economic Alternatives, University of National and World Economy, Sofia, Bulgaria, issue 1, pages 50-78, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:nwe:eajour:y:2020:i:1:p:50-78
    as

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    File URL: https://www.unwe.bg/doi/eajournal/2020.1/EA.2020.1.03.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Stephen Ansolabehere & John M. de Figueiredo & James M. Snyder Jr, 2003. "Why is There so Little Money in U.S. Politics?," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 17(1), pages 105-130, Winter.
    2. Austin Murphy, 2019. "A model of optimising political expenditures to buy government power," Economic and Political Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 7(4), pages 433-453, October.
    3. Bradfield, Anthony J. & Kagel, John H., 2015. "Legislative bargaining with teams," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 93(C), pages 117-127.
    4. Alexander Dyck & David Moss & Luigi Zingales, 2013. "Media versus Special Interests," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 56(3), pages 521-553.
    5. Jayachandran, Seema, 2006. "The Jeffords Effect," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 49(2), pages 397-425, October.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    money; Lobbying; government; political capital; elections; Marxism;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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