Voluntary Binding Arbitration as an Alternative to Tax Court Litigation
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DOI: 10.1086/NTJ41789257
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- Steven J. Brams & Samuel Merrill, III, 1983. "Equilibrium Strategies for Final-Offer Arbitration: There is no Median Convergence," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 29(8), pages 927-941, August.
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- William F. Samuelson, 1991. "Final-Offer Arbitration Under Incomplete Information," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 37(10), pages 1234-1247, October.
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Cited by:
- Sungsoo Yoon & Seung Won Yoo, 2007. "Diffusion of Tax Innovation and Post‐Audit Settlement," Accounting Research Journal, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, vol. 20(2), pages 89-95, December.
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