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Final-Offer Arbitration Under Incomplete Information

Author

Listed:
  • William F. Samuelson

    (School of Management, Boston University, Boston, Massachusetts 02215)

Abstract

In recent years, final-offer arbitration (FOA) has become an increasingly frequent means of resolving labor disputes in the private and public sectors. The present paper models FOA when each disputant has private information bearing on the true value of the case. The model characterizes the disputants' equilibrium offer behavior and examines arbitration performance. The main conclusion is that FOA outcomes are crudely responsive to the underlying merits of the case. In its favor, FOA can be expected to be less costly to administer than arbitration procedures that attempt to extract perfect information.

Suggested Citation

  • William F. Samuelson, 1991. "Final-Offer Arbitration Under Incomplete Information," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 37(10), pages 1234-1247, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:inm:ormnsc:v:37:y:1991:i:10:p:1234-1247
    DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.37.10.1234
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Zeng, Dao-Zhi, 2003. "An amendment to final-offer arbitration," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 9-19, August.
    2. Dickinson, David L. & McEvoy, David M. & Bruner, David M., 2022. "The impact of sleep restriction on interpersonal conflict resolution and the narcotic effect," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 194(C), pages 71-90.
    3. Armstrong, Michael J. & Hurley, W. J., 2002. "Arbitration using the closest offer principle of arbitrator behavior," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 19-26, January.
    4. Farmer, Amy & Pecorino, Paul, 2022. "Discovery in a screening model of final offer arbitration," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(C).
    5. Sansing, Richard, 1997. "Voluntary Binding Arbitration as an Alternative to Tax Court Litigation," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association, vol. 50(2), pages 279-96, June.
    6. Sansing, Richard, 1997. "Voluntary Binding Arbitration as an Alternative to Tax Court Litigation," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association;National Tax Journal, vol. 50(2), pages 279-296, June.
    7. Brian R. Powers, 2019. "An analysis of dual-issue final-offer arbitration," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 48(1), pages 81-108, March.
    8. Mazalov, Vladimir & Tokareva, Julia, 2012. "Arbitration procedures with multiple arbitrators," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 217(1), pages 198-203.

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