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Sales Tax Compliance and Audit Selection

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  • Murray, Matthew N.

Abstract

Uses sample selection estimation techniques to identify systematic audit selection rules and determinants of sales tax underreporting. Though based on data from only one state (Tennessee), outcomes are useful in developing and evaluating audit selection results.

Suggested Citation

  • Murray, Matthew N., 1995. "Sales Tax Compliance and Audit Selection," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association;National Tax Journal, vol. 48(4), pages 515-530, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:ntj:journl:v:48:y:1995:i:4:p:515-30
    DOI: 10.1086/NTJ41789168
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. repec:bla:scandj:v:89:y:1987:i:2:p:183-92 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Alm, James & Bahl, Roy & Murray, Matthew N., 1993. "Audit selection and income tax underreporting in the tax compliance game," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 1-33, October.
    3. Graetz, Michael J & Reinganum, Jennifer F & Wilde, Louis L, 1986. "The Tax Compliance Game: Toward an Interactive Theory of Law Enforcement," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 2(1), pages 1-32, Spring.
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    Cited by:

    1. Murray, Matthew N., 1997. "Would Tax Evasion and Tax Avoidance Undermine a National Retail Sales Tax?," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association;National Tax Journal, vol. 50(1), pages 167-182, March.
    2. Belnap, Andrew & Welsch, Anthony & Williams, Braden, 2023. "Remote tax authority," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 75(2).
    3. James Alm, 2012. "Measuring, explaining, and controlling tax evasion: lessons from theory, experiments, and field studies," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 19(1), pages 54-77, February.
    4. Praveen Sinha, 2010. "An econometric analysis of skewed productivity outcomes," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 38(2), pages 347-360, April.
    5. Roberto José Arias, 2004. "Reglas de selección para la fiscalización de Impuestos a las Ventas," Revista de Economía y Estadística, Universidad Nacional de Córdoba, Facultad de Ciencias Económicas, Instituto de Economía y Finanzas, vol. 42(2), pages 29-62, Diciembre.
    6. James Alm, 2019. "What Motivates Tax Compliance?," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 33(2), pages 353-388, April.
    7. Imes, Amanda J. Thoe, 2013. "An examination of the sales and use tax gap based on Minnesota audit experience," Master's Theses and Plan B Papers 157013, University of Minnesota, Department of Applied Economics.
    8. Alm, James & Martinez-Vazquez, Jorge & McClellan, Chandler, 2016. "Corruption and firm tax evasion," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 124(C), pages 146-163.
    9. Siglé, Maarten & Goslinga, Sjoerd & Speklé, Roland & van der Hel, Lisette & Veldhuizen, Robbert, 2018. "Corporate tax compliance: Is a change towards trust-based tax strategies justified?," Journal of International Accounting, Auditing and Taxation, Elsevier, vol. 32(C), pages 3-16.
    10. James Alm & Yongzheng Liu & Kewei Zhang, 2019. "Financial constraints and firm tax evasion," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 26(1), pages 71-102, February.
    11. William F. Fox & Matthew N. Murray, 2005. "Sales Taxation in a Global Economy," Contributions to Economic Analysis, in: Taxing the Hard-to-tax: Lessons from Theory and Practice, pages 221-244, Emerald Group Publishing Limited.
    12. Katarina Ott, 1998. "Tax Administration Reform in Transition: The Case of Croatia," Occasional paper series 05, Institute of Public Finance.
    13. Murray, Matthew N., 1997. "Would Tax Evasion and Tax Avoidance Undermine a National Retail Sales Tax?," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association, vol. 50(1), pages 167-82, March.
    14. Yahel Ma’ayan & Abraham Carmeli, 2016. "Internal Audits as a Source of Ethical Behavior, Efficiency, and Effectiveness in Work Units," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 137(2), pages 347-363, August.
    15. Alissa, Walid & Capkun, Vedran & Jeanjean, Thomas & Suca, Nadja, 2014. "An empirical investigation of the impact of audit and auditor characteristics on auditor performance," Accounting, Organizations and Society, Elsevier, vol. 39(7), pages 495-510.
    16. Leonardo Barros Torres & Jaylson Jair da Silveira, Gilberto Tadeu Lima, 2022. "To Comply or not to Comply: Persistent Heterogeneity in Tax Compliance and Macroeconomic Dynamics," Working Papers, Department of Economics 2022_04, University of São Paulo (FEA-USP).
    17. Fabio Méndez, 2014. "Can corruption foster regulatory compliance?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 158(1), pages 189-207, January.
    18. Chan, K. Hung & Lin, Kenny Z. & Mo, Phyllis L.L., 2010. "Will a departure from tax-based accounting encourage tax noncompliance? Archival evidence from a transition economy," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(1), pages 58-73, May.

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