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Trusting Individuals Versus Trusting Institutions

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  • Robert E. Goodin

Abstract

Hume is right: assuming the good will be good regardless, `institutions designed for knaves' will unambiguously increase contract compliance. But what if the establishment of public enforcement institutions undermines private virtue? Using a deliberately stylized model, this article traces several scenarios in which demoralization might occur. The aim is to calibrate the tolerances of the trust system, showing just how bad that demoralization would have to be before we would be better off simply trusting private individuals to honor their contracts autonomously rather than commissioning public institutions to enforce them.

Suggested Citation

  • Robert E. Goodin, 2000. "Trusting Individuals Versus Trusting Institutions," Rationality and Society, , vol. 12(4), pages 381-395, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:ratsoc:v:12:y:2000:i:4:p:381-395
    DOI: 10.1177/104346300012004002
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    4. Parry, Geraint, 1976. "Trust, Distrust and Consensus," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 6(2), pages 129-142, April.
    5. Brennan, G. & Güth, W. & Kliemt, H., 1997. "Trust in the Shadow of the Courts," Other publications TiSEM e910a5d9-5939-4d45-b940-9, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    6. Brennan, Geoffrey & Güth, Werner & Kliemt, Hartmut, 1997. "Trust in the shadow of the courts if judges are no better," SFB 373 Discussion Papers 1997,44, Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes.
    7. Frey, Bruno S, 1997. "A Constitution for Knaves Crowds Out Civic Virtues," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 107(443), pages 1043-1053, July.
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