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Regulatory compliance with limited enforceability: Evidence from privacy policies

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  • Ganglmair, Bernhard
  • Krämer, Julia
  • Gambato, Jacopo

Abstract

The EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) of 2018 introduced stringent transparency rules compelling firms to disclose, in accessible language, details of their data collection, processing, and use. The specifics of the disclosure requirement are objective, and its compliance is easily verifiable; readability, however, is subjective and difficult to enforce. We use a simple inspection model to show how this asymmetric enforceability of regulatory rules and the corresponding firm compliance are linked. We then examine this link empirically using a large sample of privacy policies from German firms. We use text-as-data techniques to construct measures of disclosure and readability and show that firms increased the disclosure volume, but the readability of their privacy policies did not improve. Larger firms in concentrated industries demonstrated a stronger response in readability compliance, potentially due to heightened regulatory scrutiny. Moreover, data protection authorities with larger budgets induce better readability compliance without effects on disclosure.

Suggested Citation

  • Ganglmair, Bernhard & Krämer, Julia & Gambato, Jacopo, 2024. "Regulatory compliance with limited enforceability: Evidence from privacy policies," ZEW Discussion Papers 24-012, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
  • Handle: RePEc:zbw:zewdip:289447
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Yannis Bakos & Florencia Marotta-Wurgler & David R. Trossen, 2014. "Does Anyone Read the Fine Print? Consumer Attention to Standard-Form Contracts," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 43(1), pages 1-35.
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    Cited by:

    1. Jacopo Gambato & Bernhard Ganglmair & Julia K. Krämer, 2024. "Effective Regulation and Firm Compliance: The Case of German Privacy Policies," NBER Chapters, in: Data Privacy Protection and the Conduct of Applied Research: Methods, Approaches and their Consequences, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    data protection; disclosure; GDPR; privacy policies; readability; regulation; text-as-data; topic models;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C81 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Data Collection and Data Estimation Methodology; Computer Programs - - - Methodology for Collecting, Estimating, and Organizing Microeconomic Data; Data Access
    • D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
    • K12 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Contract Law
    • K20 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - General
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
    • M15 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Administration - - - IT Management

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