IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/now/jlqjps/100.00015008.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

An Econometric Evaluation of Competing Explanations for the Midterm Gap

Author

Listed:
  • Knight, Brian

Abstract

This paper provides a unified theoretical and empirical analysis of three long-standing explanations for the consistent loss of support for the president's party in midterm Congressional elections: (1) a presidential penalty, defined as a preference for supporting the opposition during midterm years, (2) a surge and decline in voter turnout, and (3) a reversion to the mean in voter partisanship. To quantify the contribution of each of these factors, an econometric model is developed in which voters jointly choose whether or not to participate and which party to support in both house and presidential elections. Estimated using ANES data from both presidential and midterm years, the model can fully explain the observed midterm gaps, and counterfactual simulations demonstrate that each factor makes a sizable contribution towards the midterm gap, with the presidential penalty playing the largest role.

Suggested Citation

  • Knight, Brian, 2017. "An Econometric Evaluation of Competing Explanations for the Midterm Gap," Quarterly Journal of Political Science, now publishers, vol. 12(2), pages 205-239, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:now:jlqjps:100.00015008
    DOI: 10.1561/100.00015008
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1561/100.00015008
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1561/100.00015008?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Geoffrey Brennan & Alan Hamlin, 1998. "Expressive voting and electoral equilibrium," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 95(1), pages 149-175, April.
    2. Alesina, Alberto & Rosenthal, Howard, 1989. "Partisan Cycles in Congressional Elections and the Macroeconomy," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 83(2), pages 373-398, June.
    3. Arianna Degan & Antonio Merlo, 2011. "A Structural Model Of Turnout And Voting In Multiple Elections," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 9(2), pages 209-245, April.
    4. Tufte, Edward R., 1975. "Determinants of the Outcomes of Midterm Congressional Elections," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 69(3), pages 812-826, September.
    5. Scheve, Kenneth & Tomz, Michael, 1999. "Electoral Surprise and the Midterm Loss in US Congressional Elections," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 29(3), pages 507-521, June.
    6. Alesina, Alberto & Rosenthal, Howard, 1996. "A Theory of Divided Government," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 64(6), pages 1311-1341, November.
    7. Mebane, Walter R., 2000. "Coordination, Moderation, and Institutional Balancing in American Presidential and House Elections," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 94(1), pages 37-57, March.
    8. Olle Folke & James M. Snyder, 2012. "Gubernatorial Midterm Slumps," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 56(4), pages 931-948, October.
    9. Kernell, Samuel, 1977. "Presidential Popularity and Negative Voting: An Alternative Explanation of the Midterm Congressional Decline of the President's Party," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 71(1), pages 44-66, March.
    10. Steven D. Levitt, 1994. "An Empirical Test Of Competing Explanations For The Midterm Gap In The U.S. House," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 6(1), pages 25-37, March.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Konstantinou, Panagiotis Th. & Panagiotidis, Theodore & Roumanias, Costas, 2021. "State-dependent effect on voter turnout: The case of US House elections," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 80(C), pages 753-765.
    2. Gebhard Kirchgässner, 2016. "Voting and Popularity," CESifo Working Paper Series 6182, CESifo.
    3. Nicole Rae Baerg & Julie L. Hotchkiss & Myriam Quispe†Agnoli, 2018. "Documenting the unauthorized: Political responses to unauthorized immigration," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 30(1), pages 1-26, March.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Halberstam, Yosh & Montagnes, B. Pablo, 2015. "Presidential coattails versus the median voter: Senator selection in US elections," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 121(C), pages 40-51.
    2. Arianna Degan & Antonio Merlo, 2006. "Do Voters Vote Sincerely?," PIER Working Paper Archive 06-008, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
    3. Gebhard Kirchgässner, 2016. "Voting and Popularity," CREMA Working Paper Series 2016-08, Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA).
    4. Schelker, Mark, 2018. "Lame ducks and divided government: How voters control the unaccountable," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 131-144.
    5. Peter Calcagno & Edward Lopez, 2012. "Divided we vote," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 151(3), pages 517-536, June.
    6. Arianna Degan & Antonio Merlo, 2006. "Do Voters Vote Sincerely? Second Version," PIER Working Paper Archive 07-006, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 03 Jan 2007.
    7. Levitt, Steven D, 1994. "Using Repeat Challengers to Estimate the Effect of Campaign Spending on Election Outcomes in the U.S. House," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 102(4), pages 777-798, August.
    8. Burkhart, Simone, 2004. "Parteipolitikverflechtung: Der Einfluss der Bundespolitik auf Landtagswahlentscheidungen von 1976 bis 2002," MPIfG Discussion Paper 04/1, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies.
    9. Burkhart, Simone, 2008. "Blockierte Politik: Ursachen und Folgen von "Divided Government" in Deutschland," Schriften aus dem Max-Planck-Institut für Gesellschaftsforschung Köln, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies, volume 60, number 60.
    10. Jason Matthew DeBacker, 2015. "Flip‐Flopping: Ideological Adjustment Costs In The United States Senate," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 53(1), pages 108-128, January.
    11. Umeno, Luis Gustavo & Bugarin, Maurício Soares, 2008. "Electoral Control in the Presence of Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection," Brazilian Review of Econometrics, Sociedade Brasileira de Econometria - SBE, vol. 28(1), May.
    12. Andina-Díaz, Ascensión & Feri, Francesco & Meléndez-Jiménez, Miguel A., 2021. "Institutional flexibility, political alternation, and middle-of-the-road policies," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 204(C).
    13. Arianna Degan & Antonio Merlo, 2011. "A Structural Model Of Turnout And Voting In Multiple Elections," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 9(2), pages 209-245, April.
    14. Ray C. Fair, 2009. "Presidential and Congressional Vote‐Share Equations," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 53(1), pages 55-72, January.
    15. Saito, Hiroharu, 2022. "Loss aversion for the value of voting rights: WTA/WTP ratios for a ballot," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(C).
    16. Ray Fair, 2007. "Presidential and Congressional Vote-Share Equations," Yale School of Management Working Papers amz2389, Yale School of Management, revised 18 Mar 2007.
    17. Hibbs, Douglas A., 2010. "The 2010 Midterm Election for the US House of Representatives," MPRA Paper 25918, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    18. Mauricio Bugarin, 1998. "Vote Splitting as Insurance Against Uncertainty," Game Theory and Information 9811001, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    19. Bugarin, Mauricio S., 2009. "Vote Splitting, Reelection and Electoral Control: Political Gridlocks, Ideology and the War on Terror," Insper Working Papers wpe_199, Insper Working Paper, Insper Instituto de Ensino e Pesquisa.
    20. Morris P. Fiorina, 1991. "Elections and the Economy in the 1980s: Short- and Long-Term Effects," NBER Chapters, in: Politics and Economics in the Eighties, pages 17-40, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Midterm gap; Voting behavior; Presidential politics; Congress;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:now:jlqjps:100.00015008. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Lucy Wiseman (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.nowpublishers.com/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.