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What could be a dynamical centralized college admission system in Russia

Author

Listed:
  • Kalinin, N.

    (Guangdong Technion - Israel Institute of Technology, China)

  • Kuz'mina, A.

    (Yandex, Moscow, Russia
    HSE University, Saint Petersburg, Russia)

Abstract

University admission process in Russia was quite risky for college entrants in 2021-2022. Many participants could not be sure that they are admitted to a program until the very end of admission process. In this policy paper, we describe a dynamic version of the Gale-Shapley algorithm and study its rate of convergence. The proposed model of admission system imposes no risks on participants after they compose a preference list of universities. So, participants can decide where to submit their applications relying on their true preferences. Each participant may be sure that she/he will be proposed a place in a particular university before the other participants with lower grades. For a practical realisation the rate of convergence of an admission algorithm is very important. We provide analysis of a modelling of the proposed algorithm on a synthetic data and discuss what may be the problem cases in real life implementation and how to guarantee faster convergence in these cases.

Suggested Citation

  • Kalinin, N. & Kuz'mina, A., 2024. "What could be a dynamical centralized college admission system in Russia," Journal of the New Economic Association, New Economic Association, vol. 62(1), pages 101-115.
    • Handle: RePEc:nea:journl:y:2024:i:62:p:101-115
    DOI: 10.31737/22212264_2024_1_101-115
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Orhan Aygün & Inácio Bó, 2021. "College Admission with Multidimensional Privileges: The Brazilian Affirmative Action Case," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 13(3), pages 1-28, August.
    2. Hakimov, Rustamdjan & Kübler, Dorothea, 2021. "Experiments on centralized school choice and college admissions: a survey," EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 24(2), pages 434-488.
    3. Chen, Li & Sebastián Pereyra, Juan, 2019. "Self-selection in school choice," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 117(C), pages 59-81.
    4. Bonkoungou, Somouaoga & Nesterov, Alexander, 2021. "Comparing school choice and college admissions mechanisms by their strategic accessibility," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 16(3), July.
    5. Alexander Westkamp, 2013. "An analysis of the German university admissions system," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 53(3), pages 561-589, August.
    6. E. Zhelesova & S. Izmalkov & K. Sonin & I. Khovanskaya, 2013. "Two-Sided Markets: Theory and Applications (Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics 2012)," Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP Voprosy Ekonomiki, issue 1.
    7. Yan Chen & Onur Kesten, 2017. "Chinese College Admissions and School Choice Reforms: A Theoretical Analysis," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 125(1), pages 99-139.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    education; university admission; Gale-Shapley algorithm; mechanism design;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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