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Contracts and Domination in Competitive Economies

Author

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  • Marakulin, V.

    (Sobolev Institute of Mathematics, Russian Academy of Sciences, Novosibirsk, Russia)

Abstract

A new concept of contract-based domination by coalitions for competitive economies is proposed and studied in the paper. This concept is based on the notion of (barter) contract (an elementary exchange of commodities). Here classical coalitions domination is transferred onto systems (webs) of contracts and this way implemented contractual allocations which stability properties are investigated. It is shown that suggested approach is efficiently modeling perfect competition conditions and allows to describe various known classical concepts for a perfect economy – equilibria, core, fuzzy core etc. – in pure game-theoretical terms. For non-perfect economies, in which not every contract is permissible, it may serve as one of the model primitives to refine and to solve various theoretical problems.

Suggested Citation

  • Marakulin, V., 2011. "Contracts and Domination in Competitive Economies," Journal of the New Economic Association, New Economic Association, issue 9, pages 10-32.
    • Handle: RePEc:nea:journl:y:2011:i:9:p:10-32
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Marakulin, V.M., 2013. "On the Edgeworth conjecture for production economies with public goods: A contract-based approach," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(3), pages 189-200.
    2. Valeriy M. Marakulin, 2017. "Contracts and domination in incomplete markets: what is a true core?," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 5(1), pages 81-108, April.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    exchange economy; contract; contractual allocation; competi­tive equilibrium; core;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C62 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium
    • D51 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Exchange and Production Economies

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