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A Model of Corporate Board of Directors Elections

Author

Listed:
  • Karpov, A.

    (National Research University - Higher School of Economics, Moscow, Russia)

Abstract

Game-theoretic model of election to a corporate board of directors is proposed. It is shown that the equilibrium distribution of seats is unique. The uniqueness guarantees nonmanipulability of elections. The distribution is obtained by the d’Hondt method of seats distribution in proportional representation problem. The model is tested on real data from a Russian company.

Suggested Citation

  • Karpov, A., 2011. "A Model of Corporate Board of Directors Elections," Journal of the New Economic Association, New Economic Association, issue 12, pages 10-23.
    • Handle: RePEc:nea:journl:y:2011:i:12:p:10-23
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    File URL: http://www.econorus.org/repec/journl/2011-12-10-23r.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Russell Golman & Scott Page, 2009. "General Blotto: games of allocative strategic mismatch," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 138(3), pages 279-299, March.
    2. Ordeshook, Peter C & Zeng, Langche, 1994. "Some Properties of Hare Voting with Strategic Voters," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 78(1), pages 87-101, January.
    3. Cox, Gary W., 1994. "Strategic Voting Equilibria under the Single Nontransferable Vote," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 88(3), pages 608-621, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Karpov, Alexander, 2015. "Alliance incentives under the D’Hondt method," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 74(C), pages 1-7.
    2. Karpov, A., 2012. "Corporate Board Elections and Company's Performance," Journal of the New Economic Association, New Economic Association, vol. 16(4), pages 10-25.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Elections; board of directors; equilibrium seats distribution; d'Hondt method;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • G39 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Other

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