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Selecting the Condorcet Winner: single-stage versus multi-stage voting rules

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  • Michael Peress

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Suggested Citation

  • Michael Peress, 2008. "Selecting the Condorcet Winner: single-stage versus multi-stage voting rules," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 137(1), pages 207-220, October.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:137:y:2008:i:1:p:207-220
    DOI: 10.1007/s11127-008-9321-y
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Cox, Gary W., 1994. "Strategic Voting Equilibria under the Single Nontransferable Vote," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 88(3), pages 608-621, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Richard F. Potthoff, 2014. "Condorcet Completion Methods that Inhibit Manipulation through Exploiting Knowledge of Electorate Preferences," Games, MDPI, vol. 5(4), pages 1-30, October.
    2. Lachat, Romain & Laslier, Jean-François, 2024. "Alternatives to plurality rule for single-winner elections: When do they make a difference?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 81(C).
    3. Christian Basteck, 2016. "Scoring rules and implementation in iteratively undominated strategies," Working Papers 2016002, Berlin Doctoral Program in Economics and Management Science (BDPEMS).
    4. Healy, Paul J. & Peress, Michael, 2015. "Preference domains and the monotonicity of condorcet extensions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 130(C), pages 21-23.

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