Selecting the Condorcet Winner: single-stage versus multi-stage voting rules
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DOI: 10.1007/s11127-008-9321-y
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References listed on IDEAS
- Cox, Gary W., 1994. "Strategic Voting Equilibria under the Single Nontransferable Vote," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 88(3), pages 608-621, September.
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Cited by:
- Richard F. Potthoff, 2014. "Condorcet Completion Methods that Inhibit Manipulation through Exploiting Knowledge of Electorate Preferences," Games, MDPI, vol. 5(4), pages 1-30, October.
- Lachat, Romain & Laslier, Jean-François, 2024.
"Alternatives to plurality rule for single-winner elections: When do they make a difference?,"
European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 81(C).
- Romain Lachat & Jean-François Laslier, 2024. "Alternatives to plurality rule for single-winner elections: When do they make a difference?," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-04630321, HAL.
- Romain Lachat & Jean-François Laslier, 2024. "Alternatives to plurality rule for single-winner elections: When do they make a difference?," Post-Print halshs-04630321, HAL.
- Romain Lachat & Jean-François Laslier, 2024. "Alternatives to plurality rule for single-winner elections: When do they make a difference?," SciencePo Working papers Main halshs-04630321, HAL.
- Christian Basteck, 2016. "Scoring rules and implementation in iteratively undominated strategies," Working Papers 2016002, Berlin Doctoral Program in Economics and Management Science (BDPEMS).
- Healy, Paul J. & Peress, Michael, 2015. "Preference domains and the monotonicity of condorcet extensions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 130(C), pages 21-23.
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Keywords
Voting rules; Strategic voting; Approval voting; Single transferable vote;All these keywords.
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