IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/nea/journl/y2010i8p80-99.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Concentration of Ownership in Russian Industry: Firm-Level Evolution

Author

Listed:
  • Dolgopyatova, T.

    (IIMS HSE, Moscow, Russia)

Abstract

The paper describes dynamics of ownership concentration in Russian manufacturing, and factors of the dynamics against the background of economic growth of 2000s. The first signs of stock ownership de-concentration in some companies during 2005–2009 were revealed. Empirical analysis of determinants of changes in concentration was implemented. Significant positive factors of this decline are companies’ entry to securities markets, their work in competitive environment, and share of foreign investors. Negative influence of propensity to future investments and of the share of Russian owners was also found out. The study is based on the data of two rounds of monitoring of about 1000 large and medium-sized companies conducted by the Institute for Industrial and Market Studies from HSE in 2005 and 2009. Binary and ordinal regression models were used.

Suggested Citation

  • Dolgopyatova, T., 2010. "Concentration of Ownership in Russian Industry: Firm-Level Evolution," Journal of the New Economic Association, New Economic Association, issue 8, pages 80-99.
    • Handle: RePEc:nea:journl:y:2010:i:8:p:80-99
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.econorus.org/repec/journl/2010-8-80-99r.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Irena Grosfeld & Iraj Hashi, 2007. "Changes in Ownership Concentration in Mass Privatised Firms: evidence from Poland and the Czech Republic," Corporate Governance: An International Review, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 15(4), pages 520-534, July.
    2. Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1998. "Law and Finance," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 106(6), pages 1113-1155, December.
    3. Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez‐De‐Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, 1999. "Corporate Ownership Around the World," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 54(2), pages 471-517, April.
    4. Tatiana Dolgopyatova & Ichiro Iwasaki & Andrei A. Yakovlev (ed.), 2009. "Organization and Development of Russian Business," Palgrave Macmillan Books, Palgrave Macmillan, number 978-0-230-24949-3, December.
    5. Joseph Stiglitz, 1999. "Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes?," Challenge, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 42(6), pages 26-67, November.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. A. I. Rybalka, 2020. "Relationship of Property Structure and Performance of High-Tech Technology Companies," Studies on Russian Economic Development, Springer, vol. 31(3), pages 264-270, May.
    2. Karminsky, A. & Rybalka, A., 2018. "Negative Net Worth of Manufacturing Companies: Corporate Governance and Industry Expectations," Journal of the New Economic Association, New Economic Association, vol. 38(2), pages 76-103.
    3. Sprenger, C., 2012. "Corporate Governance Russia: of First-order Importance," Journal of the New Economic Association, New Economic Association, vol. 13(1), pages 154-157.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Katharina Pistor & Martin Raiser & Stanislaw Gelfer, 2000. "Law and Finance in Transition Economies," The Economics of Transition, The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, vol. 8(2), pages 325-368, July.
    2. Buchen, Clemens, 2010. "Emerging economic systems in Central and Eastern Europe – a qualitative and quantitative assessment," EconStor Theses, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, number 37141, January.
    3. Knyazeva, Anzhela & Knyazeva, Diana & Stiglitz, Joseph E., 2013. "Ownership change, institutional development and performance," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 37(7), pages 2605-2627.
    4. Marc van Essen & J. (Hans) van Oosterhout & Pursey P. M. A. R. Heugens, 2013. "Competition and Cooperation in Corporate Governance: The Effects of Labor Institutions on Blockholder Effectiveness in 23 European Countries," Organization Science, INFORMS, vol. 24(2), pages 530-551, April.
    5. Cabeza-García, Laura & Gómez-Ansón, Silvia, 2011. "Post-privatisation ownership concentration: Determinants and influence on firm efficiency," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(3), pages 412-430, September.
    6. Gilberto E. Arce & Edgar Robles C., 2005. "Corporate Governance in Costa Rica," Research Department Publications 3218, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
    7. Klapper, Leora F. & Love, Inessa, 2004. "Corporate governance, investor protection, and performance in emerging markets," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 10(5), pages 703-728, November.
    8. Díez-Esteban, José María & Farinha, Jorge Bento & García-Gómez, Conrado Diego, 2016. "The role of institutional investors in propagating the 2007 financial crisis in Southern Europe," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 38(C), pages 439-454.
    9. Chan-Jane Lin & Tawei Wang & Chao-Jung Pan, 2016. "Financial reporting quality and investment decisions for family firms," Asia Pacific Journal of Management, Springer, vol. 33(2), pages 499-532, June.
    10. Marco Pagano & Paolo F. Volpin, 2005. "The Political Economy of Corporate Governance," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(4), pages 1005-1030, September.
    11. Goergen, Marc & Manjon, Miguel C. & Renneboog, Luc, 2008. "Recent developments in German corporate governance," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 28(3), pages 175-193, September.
    12. Ferrell, Allen & Liang, Hao & Renneboog, Luc, 2016. "Socially responsible firms," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 122(3), pages 585-606.
    13. Doidge, Craig & Andrew Karolyi, G. & Stulz, Rene M., 2007. "Why do countries matter so much for corporate governance?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 86(1), pages 1-39, October.
    14. repec:spo:wpmain:info:hdl:2441/8221 is not listed on IDEAS
    15. Miletkov, Mihail K. & Poulsen, Annette B. & Babajide Wintoki, M., 2014. "The role of corporate board structure in attracting foreign investors," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 29(C), pages 143-157.
    16. Nicola Gennaioli & Giacomo A. M. Ponzetto, 2015. "Optimally vague contracts and the law," Economics Working Papers 1410, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Jan 2017.
    17. Oxelheim, Lars & Randoy, Trond, 2003. "The impact of foreign board membership on firm value," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 27(12), pages 2369-2392, December.
    18. Iraj Hashi, 2003. "The Legal Framework for Effective Corporate Governance: Comparative Analysis of Provisions in Selected Transition Economies," CASE Network Studies and Analyses 0268, CASE-Center for Social and Economic Research.
    19. Peter JANSEN & Gabriel Viorel RAITA, 2021. "Macro-Level Determinants of Board Effectiveness in UK and Romanian Listed Companies: A Conceptual Approach," CECCAR Business Review, Body of Expert and Licensed Accountants of Romania (CECCAR), vol. 2(10), pages 60-72, October.
    20. Anderson, Ronald W. & Hamadi, Malika, 2009. "Large powerful shareholders and cash holding," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 24422, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    21. Henrik Cronqvist & Fredrik Heyman & Mattias Nilsson & Helena Svaleryd & Jonas Vlachos, 2009. "Do Entrenched Managers Pay Their Workers More?," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 64(1), pages 309-339, February.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    stock ownership; concentration of ownership; corporate control;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
    • P26 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist and Transition Economies - - - Property Rights

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:nea:journl:y:2010:i:8:p:80-99. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Alexey Tcharykov (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/nearuea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.