IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/mup/actaun/actaun_2016064031073.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Analysis of Market Concentration in Selected Sectors of Public Procurement

Author

Listed:
  • Petr Svoboda

    (Institute of Business Economic and Management, Faculty of Economics and Administration, University of Pardubice, Studentská 95, 532 10 Pardubice, Czech Republic)

Abstract

The goal of this article is the analysis of influence of market concentration in selected areas of public procurement on chosen parameters of public procurement in years 2007 and 2011. Five concentration ratios and five parameters of contracts are calculated for each of five chosen areas of public tenders in 2007 and 2011. After this task, the correlation analysis between concentration ratios and parameters of contracts is done for finding out mutual relation between these two variables. Correlation analysis is then compared with four created hypotheses about the relationship between market concentration and parameters of public procurement The results of the analysis are surprising, because in most cases, the stated hypotheses were rejected, meaning that the correlations between the parameters of public procurement and market concentration were different than this study predicted based on economic theory. The possible reasons for this result, discussed in the article, are corruption and also poor quality of data from Information system of public procurement administered by the Ministry for Regional Development of Czech Republic.

Suggested Citation

  • Petr Svoboda, 2016. "Analysis of Market Concentration in Selected Sectors of Public Procurement," Acta Universitatis Agriculturae et Silviculturae Mendelianae Brunensis, Mendel University Press, vol. 64(3), pages 1073-1082.
    • Handle: RePEc:mup:actaun:actaun_2016064031073
    DOI: 10.11118/actaun201664031073
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://acta.mendelu.cz/doi/10.11118/actaun201664031073.html
    Download Restriction: free of charge
    File URL: http://acta.mendelu.cz/doi/10.11118/actaun201664031073.pdf
    Download Restriction: free of charge
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.11118/actaun201664031073?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Patrick Bajari, 2001. "Comparing competition and collusion: a numerical approach," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 18(1), pages 187-205.
    2. AndréS GóMez-Lobo & Stefan Szymanski, 2001. "A Law of Large Numbers: Bidding and Compulsory Competitive Tendering for Refuse Collection Contracts," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 18(1), pages 105-113, February.
    3. Paul Latreille & James Mackley, 2011. "Using Excel to Illustrate Hannah and Kay's Concentration Axioms," International Review of Economic Education, Economics Network, University of Bristol, vol. 10(1), pages 117-127.
    4. Peltzman, Sam, 1977. "The Gains and Losses from Industrial Concentration," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 20(2), pages 229-263, October.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Jan Pavel, 2010. "Analýza vlivu míry konkurence na cenu rozsáhlých staveb dopravní infrastruktury [The Analysis of the Relationship Between the Rate of Competition and the Prices of Large Transport Infrastructure Bu," Politická ekonomie, Prague University of Economics and Business, vol. 2010(3), pages 343-356.
    2. Martin Schmidt, 2015. "Price Determination in Public Procurement: A Game Theory Approach," European Financial and Accounting Journal, Prague University of Economics and Business, vol. 2015(1), pages 49-62.
    3. Germa Bel & Anton Costas, 2006. "Do Public Sector Reforms Get Rusty? Local Privatization in Spain," Journal of Economic Policy Reform, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 9(1), pages 1-24.
    4. Florencia Gabrielli, 2014. "Econometrics of First Price Auctions: a Survey of the Theoretical and Applied Literature," Económica, Departamento de Economía, Facultad de Ciencias Económicas, Universidad Nacional de La Plata, vol. 60, pages 77-118, January-D.
    5. Berger, Allen N. & Boot, Arnoud W.A., 2024. "Financial intermediation services and competition analyses: Review and paths forward for improvement," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 57(C).
    6. Jalal D. Akhavein & Allen N. Berger & David B. Humphrey, "undated". "The Effects of Megamergers on Efficiency and Prices: Evidence from a Bank Profit Function," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 1997-09, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.), revised 10 Dec 2019.
    7. J-L Hu & C-Y Fang, 2010. "Do market share and efficiency matter for each other? An application of the zero-sum gains data envelopment analysis," Journal of the Operational Research Society, Palgrave Macmillan;The OR Society, vol. 61(4), pages 647-657, April.
    8. Jin Lung Peng & Lih Ru Chen & Jennifer L. Wang & Larry Y. Tzeng, 2017. "Diversification Versus Strategic Focus: Evidence from Insurance Intermediaries in Taiwan," The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance - Issues and Practice, Palgrave Macmillan;The Geneva Association, vol. 42(3), pages 530-555, July.
    9. Biran, Omer & Forges, Françoise, 2011. "Core-stable rings in auctions with independent private values," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 73(1), pages 52-64, September.
    10. Paul H. Jensen & Robin E. Stonecash, 2004. "The Efficiency of Public Sector Outsourcing Contracts: A Literature Review," Melbourne Institute Working Paper Series wp2004n29, Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research, The University of Melbourne.
    11. Brendstrup, Bjarne & Paarsch, Harry J., 2007. "Semiparametric identification and estimation in multi-object, English auctions," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 141(1), pages 84-108, November.
    12. Iryna Okolelova & Jacob A. Bikker, 2022. "The single supervisory mechanism: Competitive implications for the banking sectors in the euro area," International Journal of Finance & Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 27(2), pages 1818-1835, April.
    13. Schmalensee, Richard., 1985. "Testing the differential efficiency hypothesis," Working papers 1628-85., Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Sloan School of Management.
    14. Nicolai J. Foss, 2002. "The Strategy and Transaction Cost Nexus Past Debates, Central Questions, and Future Research Possibilities," DRUID Working Papers 02-04, DRUID, Copenhagen Business School, Department of Industrial Economics and Strategy/Aalborg University, Department of Business Studies.
    15. Luis Mario García Lafuente & Asunción Mochón Sáez, 2022. "Competition effects in EU external aid supply tenders funded with the Pre-accession and Neighbourhood instruments," Empirica, Springer;Austrian Institute for Economic Research;Austrian Economic Association, vol. 49(2), pages 461-484, May.
    16. Rodrigo Carril & Andres Gonzalez-Lira & Michael S. Walker, 2022. "Competition under Incomplete Contracts and the Design of Procurement Policies," Working Papers 1327, Barcelona School of Economics.
    17. Schmalensee, Richard L., 1987. "Empirical studies of rivalrous behavior," Working papers 1990-87., Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Sloan School of Management.
    18. Dakshina G. De Silva & Timothy Dunne & Georgia Kosmopoulou, 2003. "An Empirical Analysis of Entrant and Incumbent Bidding in Road Construction Auctions," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 51(3), pages 295-316, September.
    19. Brown, J David & Earle, John, 2001. "Privatization, Competition and Reform Strategies: Theory and Evidence from Russian Enterprise Panel Data," CEPR Discussion Papers 2758, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    20. Biran, Omer, 2011. "Core stable bidding rings in independent private value auctions with externalities," MPRA Paper 32164, University Library of Munich, Germany.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:mup:actaun:actaun_2016064031073. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Ivo Andrle (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://mendelu.cz/en/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.