Who Receives Unemployment Insurance?
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Cited by:
- Hodges, Leslie, 2020. "Do low-income parents who receive unemployment insurance pay more child support?," Children and Youth Services Review, Elsevier, vol. 111(C).
- Leslie Hodges, 2018. "Who is Covered by Unemployment Insurance?," Research in Applied Economics, Macrothink Institute, vol. 10(3), pages 24-51, September.
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Keywords
Unemployment Insurance; unemployment; gender; race; industry; education; occupation;All these keywords.
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