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Lessons from the American federal‐state unemployment insurance system for a European unemployment benefits system

Author

Listed:
  • Christopher J. O’Leary
  • Burt S. Barnow
  • Karolien Lenaerts

Abstract

This article reviews practices in the United States (US) federal‐state unemployment insurance (UI) system regarding applicant eligibility, benefit generosity, benefit financing and emergency measures with the aim of revealing lessons for a possible European unemployment benefit system (EUBS) for European Union (EU) Member States. We overview the US system for UI and examine important areas of federal leadership. While the US system offers some good ideas for setting up an EUBS, there are also lessons in some shortcomings of the US experience. We overview existing national UI systems in the EU and review the debate on an EUBS in the EU. We identify areas of risk for individual and institutional moral hazard in a multi‐tiered UI system and give examples of monitoring methods and incentives to ameliorate such risks. We suggest approaches for gradual system development, encouraging lower‐tier behaviour, benefit financing, and responses to regional and system‐wide labour market crises. Le présent article examine les pratiques du système d'assurance‐chômage (AC) conjoint entre les Etats et le gouvernement fédéral des Etats‐Unis en matière de conditions d'ouverture des droits pour les demandeurs, de générosité des prestations, de financement des prestations et de mesures d'urgence, et ce afin d'en tirer des enseignements pour un possible système de prestations de chômage européen (SPCE) pour les Etats membres de l'Union européenne (UE). Nous présentons le système d'AC des Etats‐Unis et étudions les domaines majeurs de leadership du gouvernement fédéral. Bien que le système des Etats‐Unis propose quelques bonnes idées pour mettre en place un SPCE, certaines de ses faiblesses sont aussi porteuses d'enseignements. Nous décrivons les systèmes nationaux d'AC existant dans l'UE et analysons le débat portant sur un SPCE au sein de l'UE. Nous identifions les types de risques pour les questions morales individuelles et institutionnelles dans un système d'AC à plusieurs niveaux et donnons des exemples de méthodes de surveillance et d'incitations permettant d'améliorer les réponses à ces risques. Nous suggérons des approches pour le développement progressif d'un système, pour encourager l'action au niveau inférieur, pour financer les prestations et pour répondre aux crises du marché du travail, qu'elles soient régionales ou touchent l'ensemble du système. En este artículo se examinan las prácticas del sistema de seguro de desempleo federal y estatal de los Estados Unidos relacionadas con la elegibilidad del solicitante, la generosidad y la financiación de las prestaciones, y las medidas de emergencia, con el objetivo de extraer lecciones para el establecimiento de un posible sistema europeo de prestaciones de desempleo para los Estados miembros de la Unión Europea. Se examina el sistema de seguro de desempleo de los Estados Unidos y las esferas más importantes de la administración federal. Si bien el sistema de los EE. UU. ofrece algunas buenas ideas para establecer un sistema europeo de prestaciones de desempleo, también se pueden extraer lecciones de sus deficiencias. Se presenta una reseña de los sistemas nacionales de seguro de desempleo existentes en la Unión Europea y se analiza el debate sobre el sistema de prestaciones de desempleo de la UE. Se definen las esferas de riesgo moral individual e institucional en un sistema de seguro de desempleo de varios pilares, y se presentan ejemplos de métodos de supervisión e incentivos para atenuar dichos riesgos. Se sugieren enfoques para un desarrollo gradual del sistema, que promueven la adopción de medidas en el pilar inferior, la financiación de prestaciones y respuestas a las crisis del mercado de trabajo regionales y sistémicas. Dieser Artikel untersucht die Praxis im nationalen Arbeitslosenversicherungssystem der Vereinigten Staaten bezüglich Anspruchsberechtigung der Antragsteller, Leistungsgroßzügigkeit, Leistungsfinanzierung und Notfallmaßnahmen, um Lehren für eine mögliche Europäische Arbeitslosenversicherung für die Mitgliedsstaaten der Europäischen Union zu ziehen. Dabei wird die Arbeitslosenversicherung im amerikanischen System analysiert und es werden Bereiche benannt, in denen der Staat bestimmend ist. Das System der Vereinigten Staaten liefert zwar einige gute Ideen für die Einrichtung einer Europäischen Arbeitslosenversicherung, aber es zeigen sich auch Mängel in der amerikanischen Umsetzung. Wir liefern eine Übersicht über die bestehenden nationalen Arbeitslosenunterstützungssysteme in der EU und über die Debatte über eine Europäische Arbeitslosenversicherung. Dabei werden Bereiche individueller und institutioneller Risiken in einem mehrsäuligen Arbeitslosenversicherungssystem analysiert, und es werden Beispiele für Kontrollmechanismen und Anreize zur Eindämmung dieser Risiken gegeben. Wir schlagen einen Ansatz vor, bei dem das System schrittweise entwickelt wird, und befürworten eine Ausrichtung auf die unteren Säulen, die Finanzierung der Leistungen und Maßnahmen gegen regionale und systemweite Arbeitsmarktkrisen. В статье рассматривается практика, присущая системе страхования от безработицы в США как в федеративном государстве в вопросах, касающихся обретения права на получение пособия, его размера, финансирования выплат пособий и принятия чрезвычайных мер, в качестве источника опыта для возможной европейской системы пособий по безработице (ЕСПБ) в государствах‐членах Европейского союза (ЕС). Мы анализируем американскую систему страхования от безработицы и рассматриваем важные аспекты управления ею на федеральном уровне. Несмотря на то что система в США содержит ряд хороших идей для создания ЕСПБ, опыт её применения в США свидетельствует и о ряде недостатков. В статье анализируются существующие в странах ЕС национальные системы страхования от безработицы и освещаются дебаты о создании ЕСПБ в ЕС. Мы определяем источники морального риска для отдельных лиц и институтов в многоуровневой системе страхования от безработицы и приводим примеры методов мониторинга и стимулирования, минимизирующих эти риски. Предлагаются подходы к постепенному становлению системы, поощрению добросовестного поведения на её нижних уровнях, финансированию пособий и реагированию на региональные и общесистемные кризисы на рынке труда. 文章回顾了美国联邦‐州失业保险制度关于申请人资格、福利待遇水平、福利融资和紧急措施的规定, 以期为欧盟成员国可能建立的欧盟失业津贴制度提供启示。我们概览了美国失业保险制度, 研究了联邦领导的重要领域。尽管美国制度为建立欧盟失业津贴制度 (EUBS)提供了一些好的想法, 但也需从其经验中的不足之处吸取教训。我们概览了欧盟现有的国家失业保险制度, 回顾了欧盟关于欧盟失业津贴制度的辩论。我们识别了多层次失业保险制度中个人和机构的道德风险领域, 列举了有关减轻这些风险的监管方法和激励措施的一些例证。我们建议采用渐进式方法制定制度, 鼓励降低层次、福利融资以及应对区域和系统劳动力市场危机。 يستعرض هذا المقال الممارسات السائدة في نظام التأمين الفيدرالي ضد البطالة في الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية فيما يتعلق بأهلية مقدم الطلب، وقيمة المنافع، وتمويل المنافع، وتدابير الطوارئ، وذلك بغية الكشف عن الدروس التي يمكن أن يُستفاد منها في إنشاء نظام أوروبي لمنافع البطالة في الدول الأعضاء في الاتحاد الأوروبي. ونقوم بالنظر في النظام الأمريكي للتأمين ضد البطالة وبدراسة المجالات الهامة للقيادة الفيدرالية. ففي حين يتيح النظام الأمريكي أفكاراً جيدة لإنشاء نظام أوروبي لمنافع البطالة، إلا أن هناك دروس ينبغي الاستفادة منها بخصوص بعض النقائص في التجربة الأمريكية. ونقدم في هذا المقال لمحة عامة عن نظم التأمين ضد البطالة القائمة في الاتحاد الأوروبي ونستعرض النقاش بشأن نظام أوروبي لمنافع البطالة في الاتحاد الأوروبي. ونحدد كذلك المخاطر التي تحدق بالفرد والمخاطر المعنوية المؤسساتية في نظم متدرجة للتأمين ضد البطالة، ونعطي أمثلة عن طرائق الرصد والحوافز التي من شأنها أن تحسن مقاومة هذه المخاطر. ونقترح نُهُجاً للتطوير التدريجي للنظم، مع تشجيع سلوك الطبقة الأدنى، وتمويل المنافع، والاستجابات للأزمات الإقليمية وأزمات النظم في سوق العمل. Este artigo analisa as práticas no sistema federal de seguro‐desemprego (UI, unemployment insurance) nos Estados Unidos com relação à elegibilidade do requerente, a generosidade do benefício, o financiamento do benefício e o surgimento de medidas, com o objetivo de tirar lições para um possível sistema europeu de prestações sociais no desemprego (EUBS, European unemployment benefit system) para os estados‐membros da União Europeia. Resumimos o sistema dos Estados Unidos de seguro‐desemprego e examinamos importantes áreas de liderança federal. Embora o sistema dos Estados Unidos ofereça algumas boas ideias para o estabelecimento de um sistema europeu de prestações sociais no desemprego, há também lições sobre algumas desvantagens da experiência americana. Sintetizamos os sistemas nacionais existentes de seguro‐desemprego na UE e examinamos o debate sobre um sistema europeu de prestações sociais no desemprego (EUBS) na UE. Identificamos áreas de risco de conflito de interesses entre participantes individuais e institucionais em um sistema multiníveis de seguro‐desemprego e damos exemplos de métodos de monitoramento e incentivos para atenuar esses riscos. Sugerimos abordagens para o desenvolvimento gradual do sistema, incentivando um comportamento característico de nível inferior, o financiamento dos benefícios e respostas às crises do mercado de trabalho regional e em todo o sistema.

Suggested Citation

  • Christopher J. O’Leary & Burt S. Barnow & Karolien Lenaerts, 2020. "Lessons from the American federal‐state unemployment insurance system for a European unemployment benefits system," International Social Security Review, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 73(1), pages 3-34, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:wly:intssr:v:73:y:2020:i:1:p:3-34
    DOI: 10.1111/issr.12226
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    27. Beblavý, Miroslav & Lenaerts, Karolien, 2017. "Feasibility and Added Value of a European Unemployment Benefits Scheme," CEPS Papers 12230, Centre for European Policy Studies.
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    Cited by:

    1. Léo Aparisi de Lannoy & Xavier Ragot, 2017. "Une (ré) assurance chômage européenne," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-03455381, HAL.
    2. Rainer Eppel & Thomas Horvath & Helmut Mahringer, 2018. "Das Aussetzen von Beschäftigungsverhältnissen als betriebliche Strategie zum Ausgleich von Schwankungen des Personalbedarfs. Ein Update," WIFO Monatsberichte (monthly reports), WIFO, vol. 91(11), pages 799-810, November.
    3. Lenaerts, Karolien & Paquier, Félix & Simonetta, Suzanne, 2017. "Unemployment Insurance in America: A model for Europe?," CEPS Papers 12684, Centre for European Policy Studies.
    4. repec:spo:wpmain:info:hdl:2441/5i0jcpu6sk96cpn76n8q0ie20c is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Beblavý, Miroslav & Lenaerts, Karolien, 2017. "Feasibility and Added Value of a European Unemployment Benefits Scheme," CEPS Papers 12230, Centre for European Policy Studies.
    6. Rainer Eppel & Thomas Horvath & Helmut Mahringer, 2018. "Das Aussetzen von Beschäftigungsverhältnissen als betriebliche Strategie zum Ausgleich schwankenden Personalbedarfs. Ein Update," WIFO Studies, WIFO, number 61245, August.
    7. Léo Aparisi de Lannoy & Xavier Ragot, 2017. "Une (ré) assurance chômage européenne," Sciences Po publications info:hdl:2441/69i5rbio799, Sciences Po.
    8. Christopher J. O’Leary & Burt S. Barnow & Karolien Lenaerts, 2020. "Lessons from the American federal‐state unemployment insurance system for a European unemployment benefits system," International Social Security Review, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 73(1), pages 3-34, January.
    9. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/5i0jcpu6sk96cpn76n8q0ie20c is not listed on IDEAS

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    22. Beblavý, Miroslav & Lenaerts, Karolien & Maselli, Ilaria, 2017. "Design of a European Unemployment Benefit Scheme," CEPS Papers 12263, Centre for European Policy Studies.

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    JEL classification:

    • J65 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Unemployment Insurance; Severance Pay; Plant Closings
    • H81 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - Governmental Loans; Loan Guarantees; Credits; Grants; Bailouts
    • H87 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - International Fiscal Issues; International Public Goods

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