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Directors¡¯ Remuneration and Corporate Governance within the UK

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  • Tasnuva Jahan

Abstract

In this era of globalization and rapid growth of world economy size of directors¡¯ remuneration is a matter of international debate. Current anxieties are around the increase in executive pay as reports disclose that executive pay no longer corresponds with performance and the gap of wealth have widened since the 1980s. The courts, nevertheless, has been reluctant to scrutinise this condition, neither has the legislature shown any interest to fix any standard of pay. Model Articles for Public Companies allow the board of directors to delegate their powers on conditions they seem fit. Compared the pay of CEOs of companies of Japan, Germany and UK with the USA and found that USA and UK were closest with their generous pay. This comparison is important since the UK and the USA have been taking serious techniques to prevent extra pay. This paper will discuss about the issues with remuneration highlighting the legal control of director¡¯s remuneration and the flaws of regulations from different viewpoints of shareholder, executive and company along with social and economic the factors that increases director¡¯s remuneration.?

Suggested Citation

  • Tasnuva Jahan, 2017. "Directors¡¯ Remuneration and Corporate Governance within the UK," International Journal of Learning and Development, Macrothink Institute, vol. 7(3), pages 12-22, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:mth:ijld88:v:7:y:2017:i:3:p:12-22
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Chizu Nakajima & Wes Harry, 2012. "Guest Editors' Introduction," International Studies of Management & Organization, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 42(3), pages 3-12, January.
    2. Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, 2003. "Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 17(3), pages 71-92, Summer.
    3. Mary O'Sullivan & Margaret B. W. Graham, 2010. "Guest Editors' Introduction," Journal of Management Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 47(5), pages 775-790, July.
    4. Stephen Copp, 2011. "The Economic (and Moral) Case Against Capping Directors' Remuneration," Economic Affairs, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 31(Supplemen), pages 2-3, June.
    5. Bebchuk, Lucian A. & Fried, Jesse M., 2003. "Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem," Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series qt81q3136r, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics.
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • R00 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - General - - - General
    • Z0 - Other Special Topics - - General

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