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Beyond Privity 33rd International Seminar on the New Institutional Economics June 10-13, 2015, Edinburgh, United Kingdom

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  • Christoph Engel
  • Urs Schweizer

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  • Christoph Engel & Urs Schweizer, 2016. "Beyond Privity 33rd International Seminar on the New Institutional Economics June 10-13, 2015, Edinburgh, United Kingdom," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 172(1), pages 1-4, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(201603)172:1_1:bp3iso_2.0.tx_2-j
    DOI: 10.1628/093245613X14500948554234
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci & Carmine Guerriero & Zhenxing Huang, 2016. "The Property-Contract Balance," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 172(1), pages 40-64, March.
    2. Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, 2016. "Selecting among Acquitted Defendants: Procedural Choice versus Selective Compensation," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 172(1), pages 113-133, March.
    3. Martin G. Kocher & Dominik Matzat, 2016. "Preferences over Punishment and Reward Mechanisms in Social Dilemmas," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 172(1), pages 163-194, March.
    4. Gary Charness & Matthew Ellman, 2016. "Choosing and Not Choosing with and without Communication: Experimental Results on Contract Design and Selection," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 172(1), pages 142-157.
    5. Ernst Fehr & Oliver Hart & Christian Zehnder, 2008. "Contracts as reference points � experimental evidence," IEW - Working Papers 393, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
    6. Ernst Fehr & Oliver Hart & Christian Zehnder, 2011. "Contracts as Reference Points--Experimental Evidence," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 101(2), pages 493-525, April.
    7. Jonah B. Gelbach, 2016. "Can Simple Mechanism Design Results be Used to Implement the Proportionality Standard in Discovery?," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 172(1), pages 200-221.
    8. Oliver Hart & John Moore, 2008. "Contracts as Reference Points," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 123(1), pages 1-48.
    9. Benjamin E. Hermalin, 2016. "Platform-Intermediated Trade with Uncertain Quality," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 172(1), pages 5-29, March.
    10. Jonah B. Gelbach, 2016. "Can Simple Mechanism Design Results be Used to Implement the Proportionality Standard in Discovery?," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 172(1), pages 200-221, March.
    11. Alon Klement & Keren Weinshall-Margel, 2016. "Cost-Benefit Analysis of Class Actions: An Israeli Perspective," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 172(1), pages 75-103, March.
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