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Transversal Agency and Crowding Out

Author

Listed:
  • Pedro P. Barros
  • Steffen Hoernig
  • Tore Nilssen

Abstract

A country's competition agency is transversal in the sense of being active in the whole economy. We study the interaction between the competition agency and sectoral regulators and establish a scope for sectoral regulators to crowd out each other's efforts: More effort on monitoring anticompetitive behavior by one sectoral regulator causes others to do less. We also find that when government agencies interact under consensus the competition agency spends more effort on the industry with the more consumer-biased sectoral regulator, while the opposite is true under independent decisions.

Suggested Citation

  • Pedro P. Barros & Steffen Hoernig & Tore Nilssen, 2015. "Transversal Agency and Crowding Out," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 171(4), pages 589-608, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(201512)171:4_589:taaco_2.0.tx_2-g
    DOI: 10.1628/093245613X14302136524798
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. repec:hal:pseose:hal-00977619 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Cosnita-Langlais, Andreea & Tropeano, Jean-Philippe, 2013. "Fight cartels or control mergers? On the optimal allocation of enforcement efforts within competition policy," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 34(C), pages 34-40.
    3. Cécile Aubert & Jérôme Pouyet, 2004. "Competition policy, regulation and the institutional design of industry supervision," Recherches économiques de Louvain, De Boeck Université, vol. 70(2), pages 153-168.
    4. Pedro P. Barros & Steffen H. Hoernig, 2018. "Sectoral Regulators and the Competition Authority: Which Relationship is Best?," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 52(3), pages 451-472, May.
    5. Cosnita-Langlais, Andreea & Tropeano, Jean-Philippe, 2013. "Fight cartels or control mergers? On the optimal allocation of enforcement efforts within competition policy," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 34(C), pages 34-40.
    6. Jonathan Baker, 2013. "Antitrust Enforcement And Sectoral Regulation: The Competition Policy Benefits Of Concurrent Enforcement In The Communications Sector," CPI Journal, Competition Policy International, vol. 9.
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    Cited by:

    1. Pedro P. Barros & Steffen H. Hoernig, 2018. "Sectoral Regulators and the Competition Authority: Which Relationship is Best?," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 52(3), pages 451-472, May.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • L43 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Legal Monopolies and Regulation or Deregulation
    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government

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