IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/kap/revind/v54y2019i2d10.1007_s11151-018-9642-z.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Merger Control and Economic Growth of LDCs: Some Observations and Recommendations

Author

Listed:
  • Boris Begović

    (University of Belgrade)

  • Dušan Popović

    (University of Belgrade)

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to evaluate merger control as a segment of competition policy in less developed countries (LDCs) and to propose desirable regimes, using economic growth as the evaluation standard. Three regimes of merger control are recommended, depending on the level of institutional and economic development: for LDCs with low levels of both, the absence of merger control is suitable; for LDCs with intermediate levels of both, very restricted merger control is recommended; this should evolve into somewhat restricted merger control for the remaining LDCs. Advocacy is recommended as the main substitute activity of the national competition authorities.

Suggested Citation

  • Boris Begović & Dušan Popović, 2019. "Merger Control and Economic Growth of LDCs: Some Observations and Recommendations," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 54(2), pages 381-408, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:revind:v:54:y:2019:i:2:d:10.1007_s11151-018-9642-z
    DOI: 10.1007/s11151-018-9642-z
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s11151-018-9642-z
    File Function: Abstract
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1007/s11151-018-9642-z?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. repec:hal:pseose:hal-00977619 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Edward L. Glaeser & Andrei Shleifer, 2003. "The Rise of the Regulatory State," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 41(2), pages 401-425, June.
    3. Cosnita-Langlais, Andreea & Tropeano, Jean-Philippe, 2012. "Do remedies affect the efficiency defense? An optimal merger-control analysis," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 58-66.
    4. Daron Acemoglu, 2008. "Oligarchic Versus Democratic Societies," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 6(1), pages 1-44, March.
    5. Carletti, Elena & Hartmann, Philipp & Ongena, Steven, 2015. "The economic impact of merger control legislation," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(C), pages 88-104.
    6. Cosnita-Langlais, Andreea & Tropeano, Jean-Philippe, 2013. "Fight cartels or control mergers? On the optimal allocation of enforcement efforts within competition policy," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 34(C), pages 34-40.
    7. Daron Acemoglu & Simon Johnson & James A. Robinson & Pierre Yared, 2008. "Income and Democracy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(3), pages 808-842, June.
    8. Ajit Singh, 2006. "Competition and Competition Policy in Emerging Markets: International and Developmental Dimensions," Chapters, in: Philip Arestis & John S.L. McCombie & Roger Vickerman (ed.), Growth and Economic Development, chapter 12, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    9. Philippe Aghion & Peter Howitt, 2009. "The Economics of Growth," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262012634, April.
    10. Daron Acemoglu & Philippe Aghion & Fabrizio Zilibotti, 2006. "Distance to Frontier, Selection, and Economic Growth," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 4(1), pages 37-74, March.
    11. Simeon Djankov & Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, 2002. "The Regulation of Entry," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 117(1), pages 1-37.
    12. Eckbo, B Espen & Wier, Peggy, 1985. "Antimerger Policy under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act: A Reexamination of the Market Power Hypothesis," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 28(1), pages 119-149, April.
    13. Dutz, Mark & Hayri, Aydin, 1999. "Does More Intense Competition Lead to Higher Growth?," CEPR Discussion Papers 2249, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    14. Bertocchi, Graziella & Canova, Fabio, 2002. "Did colonization matter for growth?: An empirical exploration into the historical causes of Africa's underdevelopment," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(10), pages 1851-1871, December.
    15. Dutz, Mark A. & Ordover, Janusz A. & Willig, Robert D., 2000. "Entrepreneurship, access policy and economic development: Lessons from industrial organization," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 44(4-6), pages 739-747, May.
    16. Cosnita-Langlais, Andreea & Tropeano, Jean-Philippe, 2012. "Do remedies affect the efficiency defense? An optimal merger-control analysis," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 58-66.
    17. Dirk H M Akkermans, 2017. "Net profit flow per country from 1980 to 2009: The long-term effects of foreign direct investment," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 12(6), pages 1-28, June.
    18. Deng, Ping & Yang, Monica, 2015. "Cross-border mergers and acquisitions by emerging market firms: A comparative investigation," International Business Review, Elsevier, vol. 24(1), pages 157-172.
    19. Federico, Giulio & Langus, Gregor & Valletti, Tommaso, 2017. "A simple model of mergers and innovation," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 157(C), pages 136-140.
    20. Luigi Zingales, 2017. "Towards a Political Theory of the Firm," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 31(3), pages 113-130, Summer.
    21. Robert E. Hall & Charles I. Jones, 1999. "Why do Some Countries Produce So Much More Output Per Worker than Others?," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 114(1), pages 83-116.
    22. Rossi, Stefano & Volpin, Paolo F., 2004. "Cross-country determinants of mergers and acquisitions," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 74(2), pages 277-304, November.
    23. Michal S. Gal & Eleanor M. Fox, 2015. "Drafting competition law for developing jurisdictions: learning from experience," Chapters, in: Michal S. Gal & Mor Bakhoum & Josef Drexl & Eleanor M. Fox & David J. Gerber (ed.), The Economic Characteristics of Developing Jurisdictions, chapter 12, pages 296-356, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    24. Sydney Finkelstein, 1997. "Interindustry merger patterns and resource dependence: a replication and extension of Pfeffer (1972)," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 18(10), pages 787-810, November.
    25. Cooter, Robert D., 1996. "The theory of market modernization of law," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 141-172, June.
    26. Davis, Lewis S. & Williamson, Claudia R., 2016. "Culture and the regulation of entry," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(4), pages 1055-1083.
    27. Djankov, Simeon & McLiesh, Caralee & Ramalho, Rita Maria, 2006. "Regulation and growth," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 92(3), pages 395-401, September.
    28. Lipset, Seymour Martin, 1959. "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy1," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 53(1), pages 69-105, March.
    29. Stefan Voigt, 2009. "The Effects of Competition Policy on Development - Cross-Country Evidence Using Four New Indicators," Journal of Development Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 45(8), pages 1225-1248.
    30. Dutz, Mark A. & Vagliasindi, Maria, 2000. "Competition policy implementation in transition economies: An empirical assessment," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 44(4-6), pages 762-772, May.
    31. Yves Botteman, 2006. "Mergers, Standard Of Proof And Expert Economic Evidence," Journal of Competition Law and Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 2(1), pages 71-100.
    32. Xavier Vives, 2016. "Competition and Stability in Banking: The Role of Regulation and Competition Policy," Economics Books, Princeton University Press, edition 1, number 10741.
    33. repec:hal:pseose:hal-00643695 is not listed on IDEAS
    34. Tay-Cheng Ma, 2016. "Antitrust And Democracy: Perspectives From Efficiency And Equity," Journal of Competition Law and Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 12(2), pages 233-261.
    35. Lebedev, Sergey & Peng, Mike W. & Xie, En & Stevens, Charles E., 2015. "Mergers and acquisitions in and out of emerging economies," Journal of World Business, Elsevier, vol. 50(4), pages 651-662.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Zuazu, Izaskun, 2019. "The growth effect of democracy and technology: An industry disaggregated approach," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 56(C), pages 115-131.
    2. Rok Spruk & Mitja Kovac, 2018. "Inefficient Growth," Review of Economics and Institutions, Università di Perugia, vol. 9(2).
    3. Lewis Davis & Claudia R. Williamson, 2018. "Open Borders for Business? Causes and Consequences of the Regulation of Foreign Entry," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 85(2), pages 508-536, October.
    4. Cervellati Matteo & Fortunato Piergiuseppe & Sunde Uwe, 2012. "Consensual and Conflictual Democratization," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 12(1), pages 1-51, December.
    5. Olsson, Ola, 2009. "On the democratic legacy of colonialism," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(4), pages 534-551, December.
    6. Davis, Lewis S. & Williamson, Claudia R., 2016. "Culture and the regulation of entry," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(4), pages 1055-1083.
    7. Brandon N. Cline & Claudia R. Williamson, 2020. "Trust, regulation, and contracting institutions," European Financial Management, European Financial Management Association, vol. 26(4), pages 859-895, September.
    8. Fedderke, Johannes & Klitgaard, Robert, 2013. "How Much Do Rights Matter?," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 51(C), pages 187-206.
    9. Zuazu Bermejo, Izaskun, 2015. "Political Institutions, Technology and Growth: a dynamic panel approach," IKERLANAK 16266, Universidad del País Vasco - Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I.
    10. Rok Spruk & Mitja Kovac, 2019. "Transaction costs and economic growth under common legal system: State‐level evidence from Mexico," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 31(2), pages 240-292, July.
    11. Haidar, Jamal Ibrahim, 2012. "The impact of business regulatory reforms on economic growth," Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Elsevier, vol. 26(3), pages 285-307.
    12. Ahmet Faruk AYSAN & Mustapha Kamel NABLI & Marie‐Ange VÉGANZONÈS‐VAROUDAKIS, 2007. "Governance Institutions And Private Investment: An Application To The Middle East And North Africa," The Developing Economies, Institute of Developing Economies, vol. 45(3), pages 339-377, September.
    13. Torsten Persson & Guido Tabellini, 2009. "Democratic Capital: The Nexus of Political and Economic Change," American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 1(2), pages 88-126, July.
    14. Aghion, Philippe & Akcigit, Ufuk & Howitt, Peter, 2014. "What Do We Learn From Schumpeterian Growth Theory?," Handbook of Economic Growth, in: Philippe Aghion & Steven Durlauf (ed.), Handbook of Economic Growth, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 0, pages 515-563, Elsevier.
    15. Michael Breen & Robert Gillanders, 2012. "Corruption, institutions and regulation," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 13(3), pages 263-285, September.
    16. Michael H. Böheim & Klaus S. Friesenbichler, 2016. "Exporting the Competition Policy Regime of the European Union: Success or Failure? Empirical Evidence for Acceding Countries," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 54(3), pages 569-582, May.
    17. Oded Galor & Omer Moav & Dietrich Vollrath, 2009. "Inequality in Landownership, the Emergence of Human-Capital Promoting Institutions, and the Great Divergence," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 76(1), pages 143-179.
    18. Xie, En & Reddy, K.S. & Liang, Jie, 2017. "Country-specific determinants of cross-border mergers and acquisitions: A comprehensive review and future research directions," Journal of World Business, Elsevier, vol. 52(2), pages 127-183.
    19. Brückner, Markus & Gradstein, Mark, 2015. "Income growth, ethnic polarization, and political risk: Evidence from international oil price shocks," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(3), pages 575-594.
    20. Acemoglu, Daron & Johnson, Simon & Robinson, James A., 2005. "Institutions as a Fundamental Cause of Long-Run Growth," Handbook of Economic Growth, in: Philippe Aghion & Steven Durlauf (ed.), Handbook of Economic Growth, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 6, pages 385-472, Elsevier.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Advocacy; Competition policy; Economic growth; Institutional development; Merger control;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L40 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - General
    • L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:revind:v:54:y:2019:i:2:d:10.1007_s11151-018-9642-z. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.