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Tacit Collusion in Repeated Auctions. Comment

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  • Ulrich Schwalbe

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  • Ulrich Schwalbe, 2008. "Tacit Collusion in Repeated Auctions. Comment," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 164(1), pages 189-192, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(200803)164:1_189:mtcia_2.0.tx_2-e
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Baldwin, Laura H & Marshall, Robert C & Richard, Jean-Francois, 1997. "Bidder Collusion at Forest Service Timber Sales," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(4), pages 657-699, August.
    2. Andreas Blume & Paul Heidhues, 2008. "Modeling Tacit Collusion in Auctions," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 164(1), pages 163-184, March.
    3. Martin Pesendorfer, 2000. "A Study of Collusion in First-Price Auctions," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 67(3), pages 381-411.
    4. Owen R. Phillips & Dale J. Menkhaus & Kalyn T. Coatney, 2003. "Collusive Practices in Repeated English Auctions: Experimental Evidence on Bidding Rings," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(3), pages 965-979, June.
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