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Liability Rules and Evolutionary Dynamics

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  • Mingli Zheng

Abstract

We consider the convergence properties of behavior under a comparative negligence rule (CN) and under a rule of negligence with contributory negligence (NCN), assuming bilateral care with three care levels. Using an evolutionary model, we show that CN reduces the proportion of the population using low care more rapidly than does NCN. However, NCN increases the proportion of the population using high (efficient) care more rapidly than does CN. As a result, the mean care level increases more rapidly and the mean social cost falls more rapidly under CN than under NCN.

Suggested Citation

  • Mingli Zheng, 2001. "Liability Rules and Evolutionary Dynamics," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 157(4), pages 520-535, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(200112)157:4_520:lraed_2.0.tx_2-a
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    1. Steven Shavell, 2003. "Economic Analysis of Accident Law," NBER Working Papers 9483, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Wittman, Donald & Friedman, Daniel & Crevier, Stephanie & Braskin, Aaron, 1997. "Learning Liability Rules," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(1), pages 145-164, January.
    3. Arlen, Jennifer H, 1992. "Liability for Physical Injury When Injurers as Well as Victims Suffer Losses," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 8(2), pages 411-426, April.
    4. Rea, Samuel Jr., 1987. "The economics of comparative negligence," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 7(2), pages 149-162, December.
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • K13 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Tort Law and Product Liability; Forensic Economics
    • C79 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Other

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