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Streitschlichtung im Rahmen internationaler Investitionsabkommen: Viel Lärm um (fast) nichts?

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  • Nunnenkamp Peter

    (Institut für Weltwirtschaft, Kiellinie 66, 24105KielGermany, Tel.: (0431) 8814 209)

Abstract

The provisions on investor-state dispute settlement included in various international investment treaties are increasingly resisted among policymakers as well as in public debate. It is widely believed that foreign investors may enforce unjustified compensation claims against host states by resorting to international arbitration. A new database on 739 disputes, collected by UNCTAD, hardly supports this view. The often assumed pro-investor bias of arbitration panels does not appear to exist. Moreover, there is little evidence suggesting that poor host countries are discriminated due to their relatively weak bargaining position. It seems unlikely that the policy discretion of democratically elected governments is seriously constrained by ‘regulatory chill', i. e., investors threatening to make use of international arbitration.

Suggested Citation

  • Nunnenkamp Peter, 2017. "Streitschlichtung im Rahmen internationaler Investitionsabkommen: Viel Lärm um (fast) nichts?," Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftspolitik, De Gruyter, vol. 66(1), pages 61-79, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:lus:zwipol:v:66:y:2017:i:1:p:61-79:n:2
    DOI: 10.1515/zfwp-2017-0002
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    1. Aisbett, Emma & Busse, Matthias & Nunnenkamp, Peter, 2016. "Bilateral investment treaties do work: Until they don't," Kiel Working Papers 2021, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
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    Cited by:

    1. Martin Braml & Gabriel Felbermayr, 2016. "Internationaler Investitionsschutz: Die Fakten," ifo Schnelldienst, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 69(23), pages 23-28, December.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    international investment treaties; investor-state dispute settlement; arbitration panels; internationale Investitionsabkommen; Schiedsgerichte; Streitschlichtung zwischen Investoren und Staaten; international investment treaties; investor-state dispute settlement; arbitration panels;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • F53 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - International Agreements and Observance; International Organizations
    • F55 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - International Institutional Arrangements

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