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Comparing Direct and Indirect Taxation: The Influence of Framing on Tax Compliance

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  • Robert Ullmann
  • Christoph Watrin

Abstract

Standard theory of the optimal mix of direct and indirect taxation implicitly assumes that compliance is not influenced by the framing of the taxes. According to our findings, this is not the case. Using an experimental approach, we examine whether framing the tax payment decision as income tax or consumption tax influences compliance. We find that median compliance is 10.2 percentage points higher in the income tax framing. Further, we find that subjects' reaction to a change in tax rates is comparable, but reaction towards a change in detection rates is higher in the consumption tax scheme. We conclude that behavioral patterns should be taken into account when drawing conclusions about the direct-indirect tax mix

Suggested Citation

  • Robert Ullmann & Christoph Watrin, 2008. "Comparing Direct and Indirect Taxation: The Influence of Framing on Tax Compliance," European Journal of Comparative Economics, Cattaneo University (LIUC), vol. 5(1), pages 23-56, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:liu:liucej:v:5:y:2008:i:1:p:23-56
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    Cited by:

    1. Blaufus, Kay & Chirvi, Malte & Huber, Hans-Peter & Maiterth, Ralf & Sureth-Slaone, Caren, 2020. "Tax misperception and its effects on decision making: A literature review," arqus Discussion Papers in Quantitative Tax Research 261, arqus - Arbeitskreis Quantitative Steuerlehre.
    2. Salvatore Capasso & Lorenzo Cicatiello & Elina De Simone & Lodovico Santoro, 2022. "Corruption and tax revenues: Evidence from Italian regions," Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 93(4), pages 1129-1152, December.
    3. Matthias Weber & Arthur Schram, 2017. "The Non‐equivalence of Labour Market Taxes: A Real‐effort Experiment," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 127(604), pages 2187-2215, September.
    4. European Commission, 2012. "Tax reforms in EU Member States - Tax policy challenges for economic growth and fiscal sustainability – 2012 Report," Taxation Papers 34, Directorate General Taxation and Customs Union, European Commission.
    5. Pickhardt, Michael & Prinz, Aloys, 2014. "Behavioral dynamics of tax evasion – A survey," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 40(C), pages 1-19.
    6. Hussein Salia, 2016. "The Effect of Value Added Tax on Corporate Cash Flow in Ghana," International Journal of Business and Management, Canadian Center of Science and Education, vol. 11(7), pages 303-303, June.
    7. Jorge Martinez-Vazquez & Violeta Vulovic & Yongzheng Liu, 2011. "Direct versus Indirect Taxation: Trends, Theory, and Economic Significance," Chapters, in: Emilio Albi & Jorge Martinez-Vazquez (ed.), The Elgar Guide to Tax Systems, chapter 2, Edward Elgar Publishing.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Comparative analysis of tax systems ; behavioral public finance ; optimal tax mix ; noncompliance ; framing;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • H24 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Personal Income and Other Nonbusiness Taxes and Subsidies
    • H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion and Avoidance
    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation

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