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Black Markets and Optimal Evadable Taxation

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  • McLaren, John

Abstract

In a simple model of evadable indirect taxation, some surprises emerge. Because of a 'market-thinning' effect of high prices, high taxes induce multiple equilibria (low-price black markets and high-price legal markets). Further, evadability introduces a bifurcation to optimal taxation: for less effective tax administrations, the optimal tax system follows a 'cash cow' pattern, with one sector bearing all of the tax; but for relatively effective administrations, the optimum follows a slightly modified Ramsey rule. This discontinuity results from the mathematics of evasion incentives and may help explain tax reforms commonly seen over the course of economic development.

Suggested Citation

  • McLaren, John, 1998. "Black Markets and Optimal Evadable Taxation," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 108(448), pages 665-679, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:ecj:econjl:v:108:y:1998:i:448:p:665-79
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    Cited by:

    1. Peter Prazmowski, 2002. "Endogenous credibility and stabilization programmes: evidence from the Dominican Republic," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 9(14), pages 933-937.
    2. Graham, Byron & Bonner, Karen, 2024. "The role of institutions in early-stage entrepreneurship: An explainable artificial intelligence approach," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 175(C).
    3. Eliane El Badaoui & Riccardo Magnani, 2020. "Tax Policies and Informality in South Africa," Journal of International Development, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 32(3), pages 267-301, April.
    4. Channing Arndt & Finn Tarp, 2008. "Trade Policy Reform and the Missing Revenue †," Journal of African Economies, Centre for the Study of African Economies, vol. 17(1), pages 131-160, January.
    5. Mr. Montfort Mlachila & Mr. Edgardo Ruggiero & David Corvino, 2016. "Unintended Consequences: Spillovers from Nigeria’s Fuel Pricing Policies to Its Neighbor," IMF Working Papers 2016/017, International Monetary Fund.
    6. Bruno Larue & Sébastien Pouliot & Christos Constantatos, 2009. "Exports to Smuggle and Smuggling Technologies," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 17(3), pages 476-493, August.
    7. Ahiabu, Stephen, 2006. "Inflation and the underground economy," MPRA Paper 763, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Oct 2006.
    8. Hilson, Gavin, 2020. "The ‘Zambia Model’: A blueprint for formalizing artisanal and small-scale mining in sub-Saharan Africa?," Resources Policy, Elsevier, vol. 68(C).
    9. Epaphra, Manamba, 2014. "The Revenue Implications of Trade Liberalization in Tanzania," MPRA Paper 62330, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 2014.
    10. Channing Arndt & Finn Tarp, 2004. "On Trade Policy Reform and the Missing Revenue: an Application to Mozambique," Discussion Papers 04-19, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
    11. Antonis Adam, 2009. "Fiscal Reliance on Tariff Revenues: In Search of a Political Economy Explanation?," Review of Development Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 13(4), pages 610-625, November.
    12. Kubota, Keiko, 2000. "Fiscal constraints, collection costs, and trade policies," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2366, The World Bank.
    13. Robert Ullmann & Christoph Watrin, 2008. "Comparing Direct and Indirect Taxation: The Influence of Framing on Tax Compliance," European Journal of Comparative Economics, Cattaneo University (LIUC), vol. 5(1), pages 23-56, June.

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