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A gazdasági integráció hatása a kormányzati elszámoltathatóságra
[The effect of economic integration on government accountability]

Author

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  • Simonovits, Gábor

Abstract

A tanulmányban a globalizáció és a gazdasági integráltság hatását vizsgáljuk meg a gazdasági teljesítmény és a választási eredmények közti összefüggésre. Arra hívjuk fel a figyelmet, hogy a globalizáció nemcsak elhomályosítja a gazdaságpolitika és a gazdasági teljesítmény közötti kapcsolatot, hanem - mivel a fejlett országok egyre hasonlóbb külső gazdasági hatásoknak vannak kitéve - egyre könnyebbé teszi az egyes gazdaságok összehasonlítását. A tanulmány legfontosabb megállapítása: a hatalmon lévő párt újraválasztási esélye nem annyira az ország saját gazdasági teljesítményétől függ, mint annak az országok közötti átlagtól való eltérésétől: az összehasonlíthatóság lehetővé teszi a politikusok típusának rejtettségéből adódó információs aszimmetria részleges feloldását. Retrospektív szavazási modellünk hipotéziseit európai választási adatokon teszteltük. Elemzésünk eredményei megerősítik, hogy a gazdasági teljesítmény hatása nem független a külső gazdasági környezettől. Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) kód: P16.

Suggested Citation

  • Simonovits, Gábor, 2010. "A gazdasági integráció hatása a kormányzati elszámoltathatóságra [The effect of economic integration on government accountability]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(11), pages 980-993.
    • Handle: RePEc:ksa:szemle:1202
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • P16 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Capitalist Institutions; Welfare State

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