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Revealed desirability: a novel instrument for social welfare

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  • Guy Barokas

    (Ruppin Academic Center)

Abstract

The note puts forward the idea of revealed desirability, a novel instrument, which like revealed preference is observable from choice and important for individual and social welfare. We provide the axiomatic underlying individual’s choice model, preliminary experimental results that support the idea, and an appealing allocation rule that uses the revealed desirability information along with the revealed-preference information.

Suggested Citation

  • Guy Barokas, 2022. "Revealed desirability: a novel instrument for social welfare," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 93(4), pages 649-661, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:theord:v:93:y:2022:i:4:d:10.1007_s11238-021-09855-8
    DOI: 10.1007/s11238-021-09855-8
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    References listed on IDEAS

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