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Why Is There Disagreement in Bargaining?

Author

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  • Farber, Henry S
  • Bazerman, Max H

Abstract

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Suggested Citation

  • Farber, Henry S & Bazerman, Max H, 1987. "Why Is There Disagreement in Bargaining?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(2), pages 347-352, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:77:y:1987:i:2:p:347-52
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Theodore Eisenberg & Henry Farber, 2003. "The Government as Litigant: Further Tests of the Case Selection Model," American Law and Economics Review, American Law and Economics Association, vol. 5(1), pages 94-133.
    2. David Dickinson, 2009. "The Effects of Beliefs Versus Risk Attitude on Bargaining Outcomes," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 66(1), pages 69-101, January.
    3. Kyung nok Chun & Zachary Schaller & Stergios Skaperdas, 2020. "Why Are There Strikes?," Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 130(6), pages 929-956.
    4. Eric Langlais, 2008. "Cognitive dissonance, risk aversion and the pretrial negotiation impasse," Cahiers du CEREFIGE 0806, CEREFIGE (Centre Europeen de Recherche en Economie Financiere et Gestion des Entreprises), Universite de Lorraine, revised 2008.
    5. James J. Murphy & Ariel Dinar & Richard E. Howitt & Erin Mastrangelo & Stephen J. Rassenti & Vernon L. Smith, 2006. "Mechanisms for Addressing Third-Party Impacts Resulting From Voluntary Water Transfers," Chapters, in: John A. List (ed.), Using Experimental Methods in Environmental and Resource Economics, chapter 5, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    6. Eric LANGLAIS, 2010. "An Analysis Of Bounded Rationality In Judicial Litigations The Case With Loss Disappointment Averse Plaintiffs," Journal of Advanced Research in Law and Economics, ASERS Publishing, vol. 1(1), pages 42-50.
    7. Jack Hirshleifer & Evan Osborne, 1996. "The Legal Battle," UCLA Economics Working Papers 749, UCLA Department of Economics.
    8. David Dickinson & Lynn Hunnicutt, 2010. "Nonbinding recommendations: the relative effects of focal points versus uncertainty reduction on bargaining outcomes," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 69(4), pages 615-634, October.
    9. Eric Langlais, 2008. "Le "risque judiciaire" et les licenciements en France: le point de vue de l’économie du risque," Working Papers hal-04140724, HAL.
    10. Brian P. McCall, 1990. "Interest Arbitration and the Incentive to Bargain," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 34(1), pages 151-167, March.
    11. Eric Langlais, 2008. "Asymmetric information, self-serving bias and the pretrial negotiation impasse," EconomiX Working Papers 2008-30, University of Paris Nanterre, EconomiX.
    12. Kosmopoulou, Georgia & Nedelescu, Daniel M., 2022. "The effect of a larger contract zone on agreement rates under arbitration," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 100(C).
    13. David Dickinson & Lynn Hunnicutt, 2005. "Nonbinding Suggestions: The Relative Effects of Focal Points versus Uncertainty Reduction on Bargaining Outcomes," Working Papers 05-13, Department of Economics, Appalachian State University.
    14. Markus Arnold & Florian Elsinger & Frederick W. Rankin, 2021. "The Unintended Consequences of Headquarters’ Involvement in Decentralized Transfer Price Negotiations: Experimental Evidence," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 67(12), pages 7912-7931, December.

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