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Vertical Merger Policy: Special Considerations in Regulated Industries

Author

Listed:
  • David E. M. Sappington

    (University of Florida)

  • Dennis L. Weisman

    (Kansas State University)

Abstract

We examine the special considerations that vertical mergers can raise in regulated industries. We explain how regulation can affect the distribution of merger-induced benefits, the type of vertical mergers that arise, the potential for effective post-merger industry oversight, and the post-merger incentives of the merging entities. These considerations imply that vertical mergers that would reduce (enhance) welfare in unregulated settings can sometimes enhance (reduce) welfare in regulated settings.

Suggested Citation

  • David E. M. Sappington & Dennis L. Weisman, 2021. "Vertical Merger Policy: Special Considerations in Regulated Industries," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 59(2), pages 393-407, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:revind:v:59:y:2021:i:2:d:10.1007_s11151-021-09835-w
    DOI: 10.1007/s11151-021-09835-w
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Roger D. Blair, 2021. "The 2020 Vertical Merger Guidelines," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 59(2), pages 133-138, September.

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