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Pro-competitive Price Beating Guarantees: Experimental Evidence

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Listed:
  • Enrique Fatás
  • Nikolaos Georgantzís
  • Juan Máñez
  • Gerardo Sabater-Grande

Abstract

We report experimental results on duopoly pricing with and without price beating guarantees (PBG). In two control treatments, price beating is either imposed as an industry-wide rule or offered as a business strategy. Our major finding is that when price beating guarantees are imposed as a rule or offered as an option, effective prices are equal to or lower than those in a baseline treatment in which price beating is forbidden. Also, when price beating is treated as a business strategy, less than 50% of subjects adopted the guarantee, suggesting that, subjects realize the pro-competitive effects of the guarantee. Copyright Springer 2005

Suggested Citation

  • Enrique Fatás & Nikolaos Georgantzís & Juan Máñez & Gerardo Sabater-Grande, 2005. "Pro-competitive Price Beating Guarantees: Experimental Evidence," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 26(1), pages 115-136, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:revind:v:26:y:2005:i:1:p:115-136
    DOI: 10.1007/s11151-004-6614-2
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    2. Hviid, Morton & Shaffer, Greg, 1994. "Do low-price Guarantees facilitate Collusion?," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 422, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
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    5. Kaplan, Todd R., 2000. "Effective price-matching: a comment," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 18(8), pages 1291-1294, December.
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    7. Arbatskaya, Maria, 2001. "Can low-price guarantees deter entry?," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 19(9), pages 1387-1406, November.
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    Cited by:

    1. Enrique Fatás & Nikolaos Georgantz & Juan A. Máñez & Gerardo Sabater, 2013. "Experimental duopolies under price guarantees," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 45(1), pages 15-35, January.
    2. Giuseppe Attanasi & Kene Boun My & Nikolaos Georgantzís & Miguel Ginés, 2019. "Strategic Ethics: Altruism without the Other-Regarding Confound," Revue économique, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 70(6), pages 967-998.
    3. Mago, Shakun Datta & Pate, Jennifer G., 2009. "An experimental examination of competitor-based price matching guarantees," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 70(1-2), pages 342-360, May.
    4. Antonio J. Morales & Enrique Fatas, 2021. "Price competition and nominal illusion: experimental evidence and a behavioural model," SERIEs: Journal of the Spanish Economic Association, Springer;Spanish Economic Association, vol. 12(4), pages 607-632, December.
    5. Andreas Pollak, 2017. "Do Price-Matching Guarantees with Markups Facilitate Tacit Collusion? Theory and Experiment," Working Paper Series in Economics 93, University of Cologne, Department of Economics.
    6. Enrique Fatas & Juan Mañez, 2007. "Are low-price promises collusion guarantees? An experimental test of price matching policies," Spanish Economic Review, Springer;Spanish Economic Association, vol. 9(1), pages 59-77, March.

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