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Do Low-Price Guarantees Facilitate Collusion?

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  • Hviid, M.
  • Shaffer, G.

Abstract

We examine the role low-price guarantees allegedly play in supporting supracompetitive prices. We find that when firms can commit to matching or beating any lower price announced by a competitor, all Nash equilibria yield Bertrand selling prices. This result casts doubt on the robustness of the conclusions of models which restrict attention to meet-the-competition clauses only.
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Suggested Citation

  • Hviid, M. & Shaffer, G., 1994. "Do Low-Price Guarantees Facilitate Collusion?," Papers 94-01, Michigan - Center for Research on Economic & Social Theory.
    • Handle: RePEc:fth:michet:94-01
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    Cited by:

    1. Anne T. Coughlan & Greg Shaffer, 2009. "—Price-Matching Guarantees, Retail Competition, and Product-Line Assortment," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 28(3), pages 580-588, 05-06.
    2. Enrique Fatás & Juan A. Mañez, 2004. "Are Low-Price Compromises Collusion Guarantees? An Experimental Test of Price Matching Policies," Economic Working Papers at Centro de Estudios Andaluces E2004/33, Centro de Estudios Andaluces.
    3. Troncoso-Valverde Cristián, 2016. "Meet-the-competition clauses and the strategic disclosure of product quality," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 16(4), pages 1-5, October.
    4. Enrique Fatás & Nikolaos Georgantz & Juan A. Máñez & Gerardo Sabater, 2013. "Experimental duopolies under price guarantees," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 45(1), pages 15-35, January.
    5. Corts, Kenneth S., 1997. "On the competitive effects of price-matching policies," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 15(3), pages 283-299, May.
    6. Morten Hviid & Greg Shaffer, 2012. "Optimal low-price guarantees with anchoring," Quantitative Marketing and Economics (QME), Springer, vol. 10(4), pages 393-417, December.
    7. Arbatskaya, Maria & Hviid, Morten & Shaffer, Greg, 2004. "On the Incidence and Variety of Low-Price Guarantees," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 47(1), pages 307-332, April.
    8. Andreas Pollak, 2017. "Do Price-Matching Guarantees with Markups Facilitate Tacit Collusion? Theory and Experiment," Working Paper Series in Economics 93, University of Cologne, Department of Economics.
    9. Enrique Fatás & Nikolaos Georgantzís & Juan Máñez & Gerardo Sabater-Grande, 2005. "Pro-competitive Price Beating Guarantees: Experimental Evidence," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 26(1), pages 115-136, November.
    10. Morten Hviid & Greg Shaffer, 1999. "Hassle Costs: The Achilles' Heel of Price‐Matching Guarantees," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 8(4), pages 489-521, December.
    11. Trost, Michael, 2021. "The collusive efficacy of competition clauses in Bertrand Markets with capacity-constrained retailers," Hohenheim Discussion Papers in Business, Economics and Social Sciences 04-2021, University of Hohenheim, Faculty of Business, Economics and Social Sciences.
    12. Enrique Fatas & Juan Mañez, 2007. "Are low-price promises collusion guarantees? An experimental test of price matching policies," Spanish Economic Review, Springer;Spanish Economic Association, vol. 9(1), pages 59-77, March.
    13. Juncai Jiang & Nanda Kumar & Brian T. Ratchford, 2017. "Price-Matching Guarantees with Endogenous Consumer Search," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 63(10), pages 3489-3513, October.
    14. Juan A. Mañez, 2006. "Unbeatable Value Low‐Price Guarantee: Collusive Mechanism or Advertising Strategy?," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 15(1), pages 143-166, March.
    15. Juncai Jiang & Chuan He, 2021. "Low-Price Guarantees in a Dual Channel of Distribution," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 40(4), pages 765-782, July.
    16. Arbatskaya, Maria & Hviid, Morten & Shaffer, Greg, 2006. "On the use of low-price guarantees to discourage price cutting," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 24(6), pages 1139-1156, November.
    17. Kim, Byung-Cheol & Ahmed, Mishal, 2020. "Price-match guarantees and investment incentives," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 53(C).

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    Keywords

    pricing ; competition;

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