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Automated Pricing Rules in Electronic Posted Offer Markets

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Listed:
  • Cary A. Deck
  • Bart J. Wilson

Abstract

Internet markets are heralded as enhancing efficiency by providing buyers and sellers with an abundance of information. In these electronic markets, firms have the opportunity to employ "pricebots," computerized algorithms that automatically adjust prices to prevailing market conditions. This article uses laboratory methods to examine the potential market impact of the endogenous selection of three automated pricing algorithms: undercutting, low-price matching, and trigger pricing. We find that the undercutting algorithm leads to prices similar to the game-theoretic prediction. Low-price matching generates significantly higher prices, and trigger pricing results in market prices below the game-theoretic prediction. Copyright 2003, Oxford University Press.

Suggested Citation

  • Cary A. Deck & Bart J. Wilson, 2003. "Automated Pricing Rules in Electronic Posted Offer Markets," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 41(2), pages 208-223, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:ecinqu:v:41:y:2003:i:2:p:208-223
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/ei/cbg002
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Jose Apesteguia & Martin Dufwenberg & Reinhard Selten, 2007. "Blowing the Whistle," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 31(1), pages 143-166, April.
    2. Enrique Fatás & Nikolaos Georgantz & Juan A. Máñez & Gerardo Sabater, 2013. "Experimental duopolies under price guarantees," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 45(1), pages 15-35, January.
    3. Deck, Cary & Gu, Jingping, 2012. "Price increasing competition? Experimental evidence," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 84(3), pages 730-740.
    4. Douglas Davis & Oleg Korenok & Robert Reilly, 2009. "Re-matching, information and sequencing effects in posted offer markets," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 12(1), pages 65-86, March.
    5. Subhasish Dugar & Todd Sorensen, 2006. "Hassle Costs, Price-Matching Guarantees and Price Competition: An Experiment," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 28(4), pages 359-378, June.
    6. Douglas D. Davis & Oleg Korenok, 2009. "Posted Offer Markets In Near‐Continuous Time: An Experimental Investigation," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 47(3), pages 449-466, July.
    7. Justin P. Johnson & Andrew Rhodes & Matthijs Wildenbeest, 2023. "Platform Design When Sellers Use Pricing Algorithms," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 91(5), pages 1841-1879, September.
    8. Mago, Shakun Datta & Pate, Jennifer G., 2009. "An experimental examination of competitor-based price matching guarantees," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 70(1-2), pages 342-360, May.
    9. Henrik Orzen, 2008. "Counterintuitive number effects in experimental oligopolies," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 11(4), pages 390-401, December.
    10. Taylor Jaworskiy & Erik O. Kimbrough, 2012. "An Experimental Examination of Asset Pricing Under Market Uncertainty," Discussion Papers dp12-21, Department of Economics, Simon Fraser University.
    11. Enrique Fatás & Nikolaos Georgantzís & Juan Máñez & Gerardo Sabater-Grande, 2005. "Pro-competitive Price Beating Guarantees: Experimental Evidence," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 26(1), pages 115-136, November.
    12. Mongoljin Batsaikhan & Norovsambuu Tumennasan, 2018. "Output Decisions and Price Matching: Theory and Experiment," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 64(8), pages 3609-3624, August.
    13. Cary A. Deck & Bart J. Wilson, 2005. "Auction Markets for Evaluations," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 72(1), pages 42-62, July.
    14. Enrique Fatas & Juan Mañez, 2007. "Are low-price promises collusion guarantees? An experimental test of price matching policies," Spanish Economic Review, Springer;Spanish Economic Association, vol. 9(1), pages 59-77, March.
    15. Taylor Jaworski & Erik O. Kimbrough, 2016. "Bubbles, Crashes, And Endogenous Uncertainty In Linked Asset And Product Markets," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 57(1), pages 155-176, February.

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