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Contracts and Quality in the California Winegrape Industry

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Listed:
  • Rachael E. Goodhue
  • Dale M. Heien
  • Hyunok Lee
  • Daniel A. Sumner

Abstract

We analyze the relationship between product quality and contracting choices using the results of a survey of California winegrape growers. Growers who produce high-quality grapes are more likely to use formal written contracts than are growers who produce low-quality grapes. Written contracts for high-quality grapes are more likely to include provisions regarding the production process, while written contracts for low-quality grapes are more likely to include explicit financial incentives for sugar content and other product attributes.

Suggested Citation

  • Rachael E. Goodhue & Dale M. Heien & Hyunok Lee & Daniel A. Sumner, 2003. "Contracts and Quality in the California Winegrape Industry," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 23(3_4), pages 267-282, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:revind:v:23:y:2003:i:3_4:p:267-282
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